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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the 
sociological imagination • . • is the capacity to shift from 
one perspective to another--from the political to the psycho-
logical; from examination of a single family to comparative 
assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the 
theological school to the military establishment; from con-
siderations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary 
poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal 
and remote transformations to the most intimate features of 
the human self--and to see the relations between the two 
(Mills, 1972:7). 
It is equally evident that at no time would the number of 
such individuals have been very large (Radin 195 7 :xxi). 
Introduction 
In the course of living all men establish a·set of rudimentary as-
sumptions. These assumptions and theories are expressed in the rough-
and-ready circumstances of everyday usage. Sometimes these words and 
actions are more pungent and articulate than more sophisticated expres-
sions might be, but sometimes they are limited and insufficient. From 
these life expressions we know that all aspects of nature are intricately 
interconnected and interwoven with each other and that some events, in 
particular, seem always to cause others. However, our connnon sense 
understanding is often inadequate when we need to know exactly what these 
interconnections are and what events specifically cause others. Conse-
quently, we are compelled to think more critically and analytically about 
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our ideas and about the nature of the facts we experience. We therefore, 
devise systematic methods so that our theories about cause-and-effect 
relationship can be tested. Certainly, not all individuals in a society 
perceive the need for their theories to be testable, but thought becomes 
more consciously critical and analytical as the human desire to know and 
understand is fulfilled. 
Moreover, common sense is helpless when elements which have to 
be taken into account are very numerous: a housewife needs no 
statistics for making her plans, but without elaborate statis-
tical calculations the planning of national economy will end 
in a calamity (Andreski 1969:39). 
Almost from the outset of their career, homo sapiens have used dis-
tinctively human facilities not only to make substantial tools for use in 
the physical world, but also to imagine supernatural forces through which 
they could relate to it. Man, then, through the ages has been simul-
taneously trying to understand, and to utilize, natural processes and 
create imaginary beings in his own image that he hoped to coerce or 
cajole. He was building up science and superstition, as it were, side 
by side. For many centuries, to aid in this expianation of his sur-
roundings, man developed animistic, anthromorphic and supernatural philo-
sophies to supplement his common sense perceptions. Science as the most 
recent philosophy in this chain of inventions is also utilized for this 
purpose. These philosophies have more than an explanatory function. 
They also sustained man with illusions and provided him with courage, 
comfort, consolation, confidence, and a means for environmental control, 
all of which have a biological and social survival value. 
The priori and·most important means an individual has at his dispo-
sal for knowing his environmentis perceptions of his everyday common 
sense experiences. Although these experiences may be adequate for his 
immediate needs, they necessarily limit his total understanding. Often 
common sense concepts "are not consensually defined and most frequently 
they refer to what is sensed, not what is analyzed" (Denzin 1970:38). 
Therefore, development of specific philosophies was necessary as a means 
of predicting future events, as well as for setting-up of various social 
sanctions. As the size of groups and societies increased, specializa-
tion were necessary, organized by a division of labour to enable the 
totality of the social group to more efficiently secure its survival was 
inevitable. Accordingly, professionals were also necessary to act as 
social interpreters. 
Their vision and knowledge, a mystery to other men, were sup-
posed to give them the power to propitiate the gods and in-
fluence natural forces. Operating thus as mediators between 
the gods and men, the priests [as these persons came to be 
called] were therefore considered to stand above other men, 
closer to the gods (Sennett and Cobb 1973:226 italics added). 
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These men were also professionals whose social function it was to "inter-
pret mysteries which affect the lives of those who do not understand", or 
for reasons of individual specialization have not the time to study the 
"evils" of the cosmos (Sennett and Cobb 1973:227). 
In many cases these individuals possessed some charismatic qualities 
with the result that their position became revered. As professionals 
their knowledge was considered to have a universal quality that was 
needed in daily life, and their legitimacy was more than the average in-
dividuals felt adequate to dispute (see Sennett and Cobb 1973:239; 
Bledstein 1976:90). "Today it is generally sufficient that ... [socio-
logists] bear the stamp of science to receive a sort of privileged 
credit, because we have faith in science" (Durkheim 1915:438). Further, 
"The Modern counterpart of the priest is the professional" (Sennett and 
Cobb 1973:226), whose power is such (in most Western countries at least) 
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that they have established what Burton Bledstein (1976) has entitled "The 
Culture of Professionalism". The esteem and prestige of these persons 
generally increases in direct proportion to their ability to "coerce or 
cajole" the populace "to 'trust' in the integrity of trained persons, to 
respect the moral authority of those whose claim to power lay in the 
sphere of the sacred and the charismatic" (Bledstein 1976:90; see also 
Andreski 1973:24,31). It appears, therefore, that possession of know-
ledge has a utilitarian function in certain respects that sets the knower 
apart from the remainder of humanity, and such an image revives notions 
of the Platonian statement that "The wise shall lead and rule, and the 
ignorant shall follow" (Popper 1971:120). 
This brings me to the first assumption in this thesis, that the 
scientist, and with him the sociologist, occupies a position in society 
credited by a populace that is: 
still possessed by the pre-Socratic magical attitude towards 
science, and towards the scientist, whom they consider as a 
somewhat glorified shaman, as wise, learned, initiated. They 
judge him by the amount of knowledge in his pu$Session, in-
stead of taking, with Socrates, his awareness of what he does 
not know as a measure of his scientific level as well as of 
his intellectual honesty (Popper 1971:129). 
Like their counterparts (the priests, magiciaJi.J!s:, sorcers, and sha-
mans,) scientists represent a social class in many ways distinct from 
the majority of the populace. Such separation was advocated by Plato 
and his contempories over a thousand years ago, and a similar attitude 
persists to this day. Historically, this class of intellectuals has been 
associated with the ruling elite, although largely free to engage in aca-
demic pursuits at will. In most cases their endeavours are oriented 
either directly or indirectly toward perpetuating m·iddle-class values 
(Bledstein 1976; and Mills 1972:95-99). The emergence of sociology has 
been the result of a few vested interests attempting to achieve a 
·"science" of understanding and social control. The ideas heralding this 
event can be traced back to before the time of Christ. More recently 
however, the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw developments 
of thought and knowledge in the "sciences" themselves: in the theory of 
knowledge, in moral and political philosophy, and in the philosophy of 
history which were all such as to lead to, and emphasize the need for, 
the careful creation and elaboration of a specific science of society. 
The widespread commerce which had gradually changed and then dis-
rupted the order of Christendom was now developing into a new industrial 
capitalism in which science was becoming harnessed to agricultural and 
industrial technology and wherein secular nation states were the estab-
lished and powerful unites of political authority. The "ancien regime" 
was doomed, and it was to be torn asunder during the revolutionary 
decades at the end of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution 
especially was the symptomatic bursting of these many ills of social 
change from which present Western culture festered. 
5 
With the disruption of traditional authorities, coupled with the 
disruption of religious beliefs, a few influential men came to believe 
that they themselves were responsible for the re-making of society. This 
was a conscious assumption of man's responsibility for the directing of 
his own destiny of a kind and a magnitude quite new in history. The 
second fact, attendant upon this, was that, needing responsibility to 
undertake the total reconstruction of their society, these men also felt 
the need for a body 9f knowledge about the nature of society as a totali-
ty of institutions to serve as a firm and reliable basis for their judge-
ment and activities. That is, the natural structure of society needed to 
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be understood so that its functioning could be managed. A positive 
science of society was needed, by these political and entrepreneurial 
leaders. The positivistic theory of world history that resulted was "the 
historical self-projection of the west-European middle-class, in which 
the 'spirit of capitalism' had determined the ideals of knowledge and 
morality" (Scheler 1960:355). 
It is worthwhile to press home this point and to point out that 
this is a factor which has remained at the heart of sociology from that 
day to this. This point has already been suggested, but Norman Birnbaum 
in his On the Sociology of Current Social Research carries the matter 
somewhat further. Birnbaum (1973:218) writes: 
those methods of observation we today indetify as distinctive-
ly sociological developed in a considerable degree of isola-
tion from the development of sociological thought itself. 
Moreover, these methods developed outside the universities, in 
response to the practical requirements of governments and 
voluntary associations for valid knowledge of immediate social 
circumstances .•.• Their scientific form was given by the 
rise of statistical reasoning, their political content was 
determined by the imperatives which motivated governments and 
political groupings to examine at first hand the unprecedented 
conditions of a society which was undergoing urbanization and 
industrialization. 
As a result of the transformation of human society from the rela-
tively simple conditions of industrial agrarian communities to the vast 
complexity of the conditions of industrial and urban organization, a new 
body of knowledge was necessary if men were to exercise any effective 
control whatsoever over the social forces which these new conditions un-
leashed. "Generally, the collection of empirical social data . 
served reformist political purposes" (Birnbaum 1973:220). That is, it 
served "those seeking to exercise some control over the new industrial 
society" (Birnbaum 1973:218), or as Max Scheler (1960:355) suggests, the 
"modern industrial enterprise, [was] bent solely on the expansion of 
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power". Congruent with this development "Empirical sociology, .•. en-
tered the universities simultaneously with th~oretical sociology, in re-
sponse to the educated middle-classes' demand for orientation in a 
society become ever more bureaucratic and complex" (Birnbaum 1973:220). 
In America, a country designed to become the leading capitalist society, 
the "univesity came into existence to serve and promote professional 
authority in society" (Bledstein 1976:x). 
These influential groups, or perhaps more specifically, these con-
trolling groups, were becoming aware, not only of ideas, but of the 
visible and known implications of their economic and political activity 
and of the inter-linking of all the nations of the world into a global 
entity of human society. The merchants presented the financial motiva-
tion for this development as they sought to extend their trading rela-
tions and the links between political societies which these entailed. 
The universities through "the development of higher education • . • made 
possible a social faith in merit, competence, discipline, and control 
that were basic to accepted conceptions of achievement and success" 
(Bledstein 1976:x). The unity of mankind was therefore no longer an 
issue for ethical doubt or conviction, but was something which was clear-
ly taking place. The new conception of the responsible self-direction of 
man was therefore, at once, a conception of a united world. A view that 
is still held by man today, and one that on the surface seems possible 
taking the view that 
the middle-class person .. , [is] the world's organizer: 
••• [who seeks] accurate information, act[s] with the 
'coldest prudence,' and buil[ds] a more perfect institutional 
order than ha[s] ever been known, an order that permit[s] 
meritorious middle-class persons to realize their inner selves 
by means of publicly recognized status, power, and wealth 
(Bledstei~ 1976:27 italics added). 
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Following in the footsteps of the socerer, the priest, and the magi-
cian, sociology appears to have developed as a discipline for maintaining 
social unity and supporting the status quo. Which essentially means in 
Platonian terms "When each class in the city minds its own business, the 
money-earning class as well as the auxiliaries and the guardians, then 
this will be justice" (see Popper 1971:90). Plato's classes include the 
workers, warriors, and rulers in that order. If this is the case, then 
some evidence would exist to suggest this contention. A further com-
ment from Norman Birnbaum (1973:219) might be of assistance. He writes: 
A political motivation for the pursuit of social inquiry need 
not always be salient in the consciousness of those engaged in 
inquiry. Indeed, those actively pursuing social inquiry may 
subjectively believe themselves to be responding to a disin-
terested curiosity, when in fact political factors in the envir-
ronment may well have induced them to define their object of 
inquiry in one way rather than another (see Mills 1972:81). 
Conceding the benefit of any doubt at this point, such a situation 
may be norm rather than the exception. But as Birnbaum (_1973:224) fur-
ther points out: 
there has been an enormous increase in the employment of em-
pirical research technique by sociologists either working 
directly for or on behalf of governmental agencies, industry, 
the mass media, the political parties, and a great variety of 
interest groups. These sponsors of sociological research are, 
clearly, not interested in knowledge or orientation in an 
abstract s.ense; they seek to manipulate, to control, the 
social environment. (see also Gouldner 197lb: 439,445; Mills 
1972:76-99). 
In fact, rarely is any research performed in the United States today 
that is not conducted under the limitations and controls of some grants-
man. With the result that: 
It is unfortunate, . . . to find so many sociologists dissipa-
ting lifetimes of exhausting work while laboring under the il-
lusion that their daily conduct is regulated solely by scien-
tific curiosity. The spectacle of sociologists who energeti-
cally profess a humanistic outlook while contributing to 
the oppressive institutions in our society is .•• [an] 
example of liberal irrationality (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 
(1978:xxvii-xxviii). 
This is not to be taken to mean that all sociologists are technical 
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sorcerers in any empirical sense as Jerome Ravetz (1973) points out. On 
the other hand, Ravetz (1973:21) tells us: 
The 'technocratic' view of science is that of a basic factor 
of production, needing ever-increasing supplies of highly-
trained 'scientific-manpower'. This view of science is a 
descendant, in a simplified and vulgarized form, of a tradi-
tion extending from Francis Bacon down through Karl Marx. 
Bacon gave the aphorism 'knowledge and power meet in one'; 
and Marxist historians have attempted to show that the major 
advances in science have come as a response [however indirect] 
to the particular needs of the production at the time. 
It is also certain, that the discipline of sociology exists as a 
bureaucratized arm of the State controlled Department of Education, and 
individual sociologists have little control over how they apply their 
academic interests. Two points bear further explanation here. One is 
that "in many ways, Western sociology was and remains a response to a 
utilitarian culture". This means that since "utilitarianism . • [is] 
also a central component of the everyday culture ·of middle-class society" 
(Gouldner 1971b:61), and being "Typically, middle-class ••• with pro-
fessional pretensions", sociologists are morally obligated to "translate 
the moral cause of temperance into a scientific truth for successful 
living" (Bledstein 1976:91). The second point of relevance is suggested 
by Thomas Kuhn (1970:10-11) who says: 
The study of paradigms, ... is what mainly prepares the stu-
dent for membership in the particular scientific community 
with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men 
who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete 
models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt dis-
agreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on 
paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent con-
sensus it produces are prerequisites for . . • the genesis 
and continuation of a particular research tradition. 
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A brief look at some suggested perspectives pursued by sociologists 
might be helpful here to ascertain some understanding of what might be 
the intended or unintended consequences of their endeavours. Several 
attempts have been made to delineate the various perspective pursued by 
sociologists (Ritzer 1975). George Ritzer (1975:24) specifically sug-
gests that there are three basic paradigms within sociology: (1) The 
Social Facts Paradigm; (2) The Social Definition Paradigm; and (3) The 
Social Behaviour Paradigm. Further, Ritzer (1975:24n-25n) contends that 
these can be defined as follows: 
The social factist tends to be committed to professional goals. 
He is interested in the development of grand, abstract theory. 
If he is a researcher, he is interested in using sophisticated 
and elaborate statistics. The social factist fits Friedrichs' 
[1970] 'priestly' mode (italics added). 
The social definitionist tends to reject grand theory and ela-
borate statistics. He is more orientated to the idea that he 
possesses peculiar skills. These skills are a result of his 
training and allow him to see things that would escape the 
layman. (This is Mills' 'sociological imagination' and Weber's 
Verstehen.) The social definitionist tends to be what 
Friedrichs called the 'prophet'. The social definitionist is 
particularly interested in debunking myths about society and 
changing various things that he regards as detrimental. 
The social behaviorist tends to stand somewhere between the 
social factist and the social definitionist. He accepts the 
need to develop theory and use sophisticated methods and sta-
tistics. He also accepts a prophetic role within society. He 
tends to use his theories and methods to debunk myths, as well 
as lay the groundwork for improving society. 
These three paradigms can be summarized as follows: The Social 
Factists are concerned with groups or tatalities; the Social Defini-
tionists are concerned with interindividual-intergroup interactions; and, 
the Social Behaviourists are concerned with the individuals only (see 
also Ritzer 1975:197-198). Each of these paradigms are not unrelated as 
the above statement suggests, and, if they were, the concept of sociology 
as a discipline concerned wtih a holistic subject matter would be false. 
., 
Which means that: 
Sociology is the scientific study of all forms of human asso-
ciation: their nature, functions, interconnections, and 
patterns of change, in various types of society. Beginning 
with reflection upon common-sense assumptions, and thereafter 
employing analytical, observational, classificatory, histori-
cla and comparative methods, it seeks to establish testable 
knowledge, testable theories, about these associations 
(Fletcher 1971a:72). 
Taken literally then, it could be said that since the formulation 
of the word "Sociology" by Auguste Comte in 1839, sociology has meant 
the study of all society. However, Emile Durkheim, the exemplar of a 
social factist perspective (Ritzer 1975:36) contends that "Sociology 
can .•• be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis 
and of their functioning" (Durkheim 1962:lvi). Or to be more specific, 
the social factists contend that "social roles, institutional patterns, 
social processes, cultural pattern, culturally patterned emotions, 
social norms, group organization, social structure, devices for social 
control, etc." are the realm for sociology (Merton 1968:104; Blau 1960: 
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178). The theoretical orientation of these sociologists is structural 
functionalism. As grand theorists, they set forth "a realm of concepts 
from which are excluded many structural features of human society, fea-
tures long and accurately recognized as fundamental to its understanding" 
(Mills 1972:35). As David Lockwood (1956) has noted, such a perspective 
delivers the sociologist from any concern with "power'', with economic 
and political institutions insofar as they exist, they must exist natu-
rally, and hence be maintained (see also Mills 1972:33-49; Gouldner 
1971b:48-51). 
With respect to the social definitionist, George Ritzer (1975:84) 
suggests that MaxWeber is the exemplar of this paradigm which places 
its emphasis on social action. However, the ethnomethodologists and 
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symbolic interactionists as represented by the works of Harold Garfinkel 
(1967), Herbert Blumer (1962), and Erving Goffman (1959) might better 
fit this perspective. The emphasis here is as Blumer (1962:187) states: 
"Human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life 
of the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions". This per-
spective considers that ho\\7 individuals organize themselves is the frame-
work inside which social action takes.place, and as such, the organiza-
tion and changes in it is the concern for sociologists. That is, the 
products of the activity of acting individuals, gourps, and institutions, 
and not forces which leave such acting units out of account. In many 
respects "the systematic theory of the nature of man and of society all 
too readily becomes an elaborate and arid formulism in which the split-
ting of Concepts and their endless rearrangement becomes the central 
endeavor" (Mills 1972:23). The most important element in this perspec-
tive is the acting situation itself, or "Otherwise put, it seeks to give 
an organized account of the routine grounds for everyday action" 
(Andreski 1973:236). Thereby ignoring the fact that: 
Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of 
possible solutions require us to consider the economic and 
political instituions of the society, and not merely the per-
sonal situation and character of a scatter of individuals 
(Mills 1972:9). 
Finally, we have the social behaviour paradigm. The exemplar of 
this perspective is B. F. Skinner (Ritzer 1975:142). The subject matter 
of this paradigm is behaviour and contingencies of reinforcement. Con-
cern is only with the individual, and such concepts as mind, social 
structure, or social. institutions are ignored because they serve to dis-
tract us from a concern with behaviour (Ritzer 1975:195). One of the 
distinguishing characteristics of behavioural sociology is its clinically 
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applied aspect. Focus revolves around the behaviour of individuals as 
they interact with their environment so as to ascertain the types of 
contingencies and reinforcements that are produced in various settings, 
and which may be duplicated. When these factors are known, specific 
controls can be applied to condition the individual to accept whatever 
the behaviourist considers is best for him. This point is specifically 
set out in Skinner's (1971) book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. "Generally 
accepting the status quo, they tend to formulate problems out of the 
troubles and issues that administrators believe they face" (Mills 1972: 
96). 
In all these sociological perspectives the sociologist "tends to 
paint himself generously in hues of objectivity, humility and ratio-
nality" (Mahoney 1976:4). Such an image tends to support "the saintly 
prestige accorded him by the public", but few of his publications credi-
tably justify his being "viewed as the passionless purveyor of truth" 
(Mahoney 1976:4~5, also 8-9, 92-124; and Andreski 1973). Methodologi-
cally, the social factist tends to use the abstract tools of structured 
interviews and/or questionnaires when he engages in social research. The 
social definitionist generally employs a limited participant observation 
technique. While, the social behaviourists have traditionally favoured 
clinical laboratory experiments, although in recent years they have been 
prone to reproduce and apply similar methods in the field (see Ritzer 
1975:191-196). Rarely is there a combination of qualitative and quanti-
tative methods used to explore the same subject matter, which tends to 
suggest that many sociologists are not concerned with a holistic approach 
to studies of social phenomena. There concern is more with supporting 
their method and acquiring "personal recognition" (Mahoney 1976:118-122; 
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Andreski 1973:30). Nevertheless, one gets the impression that each of 
·these three paradigm perspectives tends to reinforce the others by means 
of a division of labour effect. Thereby, regardless of individual 
specialization sociology as a discipline still maintains a collective 
concern for the whole society in accordance with the parameters of tra-
ditional definitions. 
In his Republic Plato maintained 'that "we should begin our inquiry 
in the city, and continue it afterwards in the individual, always 
watching for points of similarity" (Popper 1971:79; Cornford 1977:55). 
This approach is still basically followed by the social factists, but 
since "society" today is larger and more complex than it was in Plato's 
day, individual sociologists are unable to effectively pursue such a 
holistic perspective. By necessity then, a division of labour is the 
only means by which the totality can be studied. Therefore,whilst the 
social factists satisfy themselves with structures and institutions, 
the social definitionists are mostly concerned with "expressions given 
off" (Goffman 1959:4), and the social behaviourists continue to concern 
themselves with "deviants" and those straying from adherence to the 
middle-class social norms for "successful living". With the result that, 
"Within this whole, the different individuals, and groups of individuals, 
with their natural inequalities, must render their specific and very un-
equal services" as defined by the social "guardians" (Popper 1971:81). 
Whilst "As practices, [these paradigms] .•. may be understood as in-
suring that we do not learn too much about man and society--the first by 
formal and cloudy ob9curantism, the second [two] by formal and empty 
ingenuity" (Mills 1972:75 italics added). Therefore, since Thomas Kuhn 
formulated the term "paradigm" in 1960, the paradigm has increasingly 
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formed "the conceptual and methodological world of the scientist" 
(Mahoney 1976:19). "Moreover", as Michael Mahoney (1976:20) suggests, 
"the prevailing paradigm not only affects what the scientist may look 
for or see, but also how he sees it". Consequently, their concern with 
"keeping the faith" implies that their "primary goal is the 'legitima-
tion' of the paradigm--that is, its confirmation, refinement, and expan-
sian" only (Mahoney 1976:20). 
It seems reasonable to suggest therefore, ,that techniques have 
dictated a view of humanity which eternalizes the present constraints to 
which men are subject. Empirical inquiries have been undertaken with 
political purposes which directly influence the use of empirical tech-
niques. Thus, it can be readily seen that the conventional notion of 
the sociological recording of process in a fixed social reality is in-
compatible with methodologies of these types (Birnbaum 1973:226-231; 
Ritzer 1975:192-197). However, overall 
the selectionist viewpoint provides a justification for the 
otherwise gratuitous functionalist assumption that every en-
during institution must have a function--in the sense of 
Radcliffe-Brown's definition of 'making a contribution to the 
continued existence of the whole' (Andreski 1973:53). 
This brings me to the second and third assumptions pertinent to this 
thesis. The second assumption is that generally sociologists engage 
themselves in pursuits that have the consequence, intended or unintended, 
of supporting. the existing political and social norms and values of mid-
dle-class society. The third assumption is that generally sociologists 
are not concerned wtih describing, explaining, and understanding the 
total intricacy of s9cial phenomena for the sake of knowledge alone. 
Their concern is more as Alvin Gouldner (1971:27) suggests: 
[a] wish to become, and to be thought of as, scientists; they 
wish to make their work more rigorous, more mathematical, more 
formal, and more powerfully instrumented. To them it is the 
scientific method of study intself, not the object studied or 
the way the object is conceived, that is the emotionally cen-
tral if not the logically defining characteristic of sociology 
(see also Andreski 1973:24,31). 
The importance of theory has already been suggested, but although 
these are of primary importance to the sociologist, and are compounded 
out of a number of orienting concepts, the view is generally held that 
the scientist cannot solve problems without them. In fact, as Thomas 
Kuhn (1970:187) suggests: 
[this means that to] solve problems at all .•• he has [to 
have] first learned the theory and some rules for applying it. 
Scientific knowledge is [in this view] embedded in theory and 
rules; problems are supplied [therefore only] to gain facility 
in their application (italics added). 
This view is totally wrong (Kuhn 1970: 188), simply because if we resort 
to our common sense understanding for a moment, it becomes clear that 
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beliefs, symbols, and assumptions that shape experience, guide perception 
and cognition, and discriminate between types of events, and s.pecify the 
subjects of inquiry. In many instances once the subject of inquiry has 
been stated, the means for solving it as it were, is often found in-
herent within that subject (see Denzin 1970:35-38). In fact, without 
these orienting concepts there is little we can know and nothing we can 
study or reflect upon, and consequently, the concept of science could not 
exist. Our common sense views are theories in a sense, but they vary 
considerably from scientific theories in sofar as they tend to be less 
absolute. These theories essentially "consists of one or more proposi-
tiona--statements capable of being true or false--that state how things 
or events referred to by the orienting concepts are related to each other" 
(Honigmann 1976:3). Strickly speaking then, these theories refer only to 
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propositions that explain how events are brought about, how they predic-
tably occur, or can be produced, and are often metaphysical in character. 
Nevertheless, learning of the various theories and scientific me-
thodologies remains a predominate occupation in most institutions of 
"higher" learning. One of the reasons for this relates to the fact that 
it is in the "academic establishments in which social theory today is 
made and taught" (Gouldner 1971b:402); and the other reason relates to 
a "growing instrumentalism, accelerated by the increasing role of the 
state" in academic affairs (Gouldner 197lb:444). Empirical problems in 
the social arena are often seen to be of minor concern, presenting a 
contradiction it would seem with the "traditional" goals of sociology. 
Alvin Gouldner (1971b:439) suggests that this situation "derives from 
its role as market researcher for the Welfare State", but is there 
really a contradiction? I shall return to this point shortly. 
Sociological theories have been constructed about features of 
social life universally present in society and culture, present in only 
certain types of society and culture, and then only in accordance with 
what previous studies have stated about them. Scientific theories at-
tempt to be always testable. Nevertheless, theories differ in compre-
hensiveness, and in the generality with which they grasp events, but at 
every level of comprehensiveness they tend to offer synchronic and dia-
chronic explanations of social and cultural phenomena. In other words, 
the greater part of these contructs consist of three basic kinds of 
propositions. Firstly, such theories specify the conditions that pre-
dictably give rise to particular social phenomena (e.g. the family, 
division of labour, deviant behaviour), and trace their consequences or 
functions. Secondly, theory consists of general propositions tracing 
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unique changes that have taken place in societies through time (e.g. 
types of religious and nonreligious practices and symbols). Related to 
these theories and in some respects forming a fourth category of theory, 
are precedures followed in studying the social phenomena described. 
These consist of methodologies and metatheoretical propositions defending 
the importance of studying something, justifying why certain methods of 
investigation or view points are preferable to others, or explaining how 
information about social phenomena is acquired. 
Basic to these theories is the belief that conceptual, empirical, 
ethical, and aesthetic knowledge are conceived to form a single unified 
system which materializes itself in society. This factor is important 
for the understanding of the aspirations of the early sociologists. As 
Don Martindale (1975: 22) has written: "one source of the appeal of 
sociology, despite the many crudities in its early forms, was its aspira-
tion for total knowledge at a time when this hope was fading". In the 
spirit of this acceptance Auguste Comte assigned to sociology the task of 
this acceptance of knowledge and bringing order to society. A similar 
pursuit was the concern of Plato and most other Greek philosophers long 
before Comte's time, and apparently this pursuit is what sociologists 
are still theoretically engaged in doing. 
In most cases the early sociologists both before and after Comte 
were grand theorists and postulated a positivistic perspective of socio-
logical endeavour. Setting the stage for this perspective Plato wrote 
in the Laws "Every artist • executes the part for the sake of the 
whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part". To facilitate him in 
his endeavour the sociologist was to bear in mind that "you are created 
for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you" (Popper 
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1971:80-81). The important theme Plato says was not the "happiness of 
individuals nor that of any particular class in the state, but only the 
happiness of the whole" (Popper 1971:169). Sociologists therefore, were 
to deliberately confine themselves to discovering and stating regulari-
ties about the nature of social systems, the interconnections between 
their parts and the relations between whole societies. This concern was 
in fact the extent to which knowledge about the entire fabric of social 
interdependency was necessary. Methods to be used in this task were to 
include those used by the natural scientists. But at this point, the 
aims of sociology were to diverge from that of a holistic philosophy, 
for like the natural sciences, sociology was not to be concerned with 
individuals, but with classes, types and species of phenomena (the defi-
nitions referred to earlier by Durkheim, Merton and Blau are especially 
relevant here). Although their methodologies were to be the same, 
sociology differed from the natural sciences in that the historical 
method was necessary because human societies were different from other 
"facts" in nature in their being historical, cumulative, cultural se-
quences of feeling, thought and action. The c:hassificatory and compara-
tive method plus the historical method were thus to support each other. 
"History therefore is not studied for its own sake but serves as 
the method of the social sciences. This is the historicist methodology" 
(Popper 1971: 75). In the generation after Hegel's death, (1831) "the 
life of nature began to be thought of as a progressive life, and to that 
extent a life resembling the life of history inherent in the Greek con-
cepts physis" (Collingwood 1976:128-9). So that, when Charles Darwin 
(1859) published The Origin of Species the idea of natural selection and 
progress was not new. With the result, as Collingwood (1976:129) points 
out: 
Evolution could now be used as a generic term covering both 
historical progress and natural progress. The victory of evo-
lution in scientific circles meant that the positivistic re-
duction of history to nature was qualified by a partial reduc-
tion of nature to history .•.. leading to the assumption 
that natural evolution was automatically progressive, creative 
by its own law of better and better forms of life; and . 
through the assumption that historical progress depended on 
the same so-called law of nature and that the methods of natu-
ral science, in its new evolutionary form, were adequate to 
the study of historical processes. 
Evolutionary theory, it is suggested, allowed for a comparative 
analysis useful for the devising of explanations about relationships 
between the parts of society as well as between societies. The like 
relationship between the parts of society as well as between societies. 
The like realtionship between the historical process and the natural 
process further suggested that society and its components were likewise 
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natural phenomena and could therefore be treated as such scientifically. 
Most of the old masters of sociology, if we may refer to them as 
such, were evolutionists, and methodologically accepted a structural-
functional approach as the most relevant for disseminating the complexity 
of the socail milieu. Each also attemped to fulfil the sociological 
task on their own. In this respect, as we have seen, it is on this point 
that they differ from their modern counterparts, who attempt to achieve 
the same end by a division of labour whereby each only concerns himself 
with a specific paradigm of the total milieu. However, all have been 
confronted with the same obstacle which is the problem of selection of 
data. 
Over-riding all purposes for these early sociologists was a desire 
to signify the importance of sociology as a science and to show not only 
how the discipline was useful for understanding society, but also how it 
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was useful for changing it. Selection of data basically then, related to 
this objective. As a result, individual bias can be observed in the 
works produced as each emphasized different categories as the ideal type 
on which the framework of all society depended. For example, Karl Marx 
emphasized economy, class, and social revolution; Emile Durkheim empha-
sized the division of labour, religion, and education; Herbert Spencer 
emphasized structure, function and social evolution; Max Weber emphasized 
bureaucracy, religion and social action, as the basis for understanding 
society. But no matter how they attacked their data the results were 
basically consistent with the perceived aims of positivistic sociology 
(see Fletcher 1971b:761-813). 
The other major problem confronting these men was how to justify 
their contentions. Phenomena that did not "fit" into their scheme was 
either ignored or relegated to a position of insignificance. The indivi-
dual consistently filled this position, and this was justified by the 
contention that all people are born tabula rasa and their behaviour is 
ultimately the result of social learning in the context of the group by 
means of symbolic "conditioning". All products of this social interac-
tion were considered to be the result of a "collective consciousness", 
and as such scientific analysis need only concern itself with examining 
social institutions and the relationships between them. These institu-
tions were considered natural phenomena and were imputed with a life of 
their own and this being of creation was what controlled all else in 
society,(Durkheim 1962:90; 1915:260,447). 
In setting up their models of the idea society (and I make this 
distinction of the singular "society" because no sociologist has totally 
described a full society), these sociologists primarily concerned them-
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selves with reducing the total universe of social phenomena to managable 
·proportions. Resorting to the perceived categories in common sense per-
ception they assumed that the first logical categories were social cate-
gories; the first classes of things being groups of men from which these 
things were integrated. This was so because men were grouped and thought 
of themselves in the form of groups and in their ideas they grouped other 
things into regular categories. Out of these ideas and opinions grew the 
idea of a society "which" Emile Durkheim (1915:424) tells us, "once born, 
obey[s] laws all their own". Once individual ideas are expressed in 
language or written down they cease to be part of ourselves, and become 
instead part of a collectivity of ideas of knowledge that has a life of 
its own. Society, culture, religion and even science are born of these 
opinions (Durkheim 1915:418,438). Thus, the pivot of the first scheme 
of nature is not the individual per se, but society and culture. The 
quest for natural symbols becomes, by the force of this argument, the 
quest for natural systems of discerning phenomena. Therefore, categories 
such as economy, class, religion, education, the family, and so on are 
perceived as natural institutions developed in this collective bank of 
knowledge. Their use as a means for describing, and explaining social 
phenomena is therefore a "natural" prerogative for science and sociology. 
Statement of the Problem 
This brings me to the major purpose of this thesis. That is, to 
describe the process of theoretical reductionism engaged in by grand 
theorists. My inter~st is in showing how theorists like Karl Narx, Max 
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and others like them develop 
their models of society. How they validate their contentions that the 
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individual need not be considered as an important unit of analysis. How 
they contend their reconstructions of the ideal society can be imple-
mented and why it is that the realm of sociological pursuit is to be 
limited to the variables they suggest. The answer to this last question 
is simply, that the variables they offer are those that support their 
particular proposition and·nothing more. Finally, my concern is to show 
what the intended and unintended consequences of these perspectives can 
be for a specific society. 
It can be assumed that most of the old masters in sociology were 
grand theorists in the positivistic tradition, and as such were propo-
nents of evolutionary theory and structural-functional methods of analy-
sis. Further, it can also be assumed that these grand theorists still 
greatly influence modern day sociology even if this is not readily ap-
parent or accepted in individual cases. 
Mention was made earlier of the possibility that there existed a 
contradiction between the traditional goals of sociology and the methods 
pursued in the discipline today. I am inclined to believe that no con-
tradiction exists, unless one confuses the goal of sociology as being 
similar to that of a holistic philosophy or a history based on a "mere 
ascertaining of facts for their own sake" (Collingwood 1976: 127). A 
positivistic sociology has two major goals: one, ascertaining facts, 
and two, framing laws. The facts are immediately ascertained by sensuous 
perception, and the laws are framed through generalizing from these facts 
by induction. In practice this means that we are concerned with both a 
"historicist" perspective and a "social engineering perspective. As 
Karl Popper (1971:22) states: 
a historicist . . • believes that intelligent political action 
is possible only if the future course of history is first 
determined, the social engineer believes that a scientific 
basis of politics would . . • consist of the factual informa-
tion necessary for the construction or alteration of social 
institutions, in accordance with our wishes and aims. Such a 
science would have to tell us what steps we must take is we 
wish, ••• to avoid depressions, or else to produce depres-
sions; or if we wish to make the distribution of wealth more 
even, or less even. 
Further, Popper (1971:24) says: 
The engineer or the technologist_approaches institutions 
rationally as means that serve certain ends, and .•• he 
judges them wholly according to thier appropriateness, effi-
ciency, simplicity, etc. The historicist, on the other hand, 
would rather attempt to find out the origin and destiny of 
these institutions in order to access the 'true role' played 
by them in the development of history--evaluating them, for 
instance, as 'willed by God' •.. or as 'serving important 
historical trends', etc. [so as the laws for future action 
might become apparent]. (italics added). 
Inherent in both these perspectives is a concern with controlling 
not only the data under review, but the social millieu from which the 
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"facts" and "laws" originated. "lt is clear that this attitude must lead 
to a rejection of the applicability of science or of reason to the prob-
lems of social life--and ultimately, to a doctrine of power, of domina-
tion and submission" (Popper 1971:5). The utopian historicist and social 
. engineering perspectives are evident in the positivistic idealism of 
Plato, and similar conceptions can be found in the works of the grand 
theorists that followed in his footsteps (see Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger 1978:228-235,456,561). Plato was concerned with developing 
a utopian society based on a division of labour; a status qua in which 
the "function" of the philosopher-scientist was to organize it into 
existence and then to supervise its maintenance. The collective activi-
ties of present day sociologists are not in my view inconsistent with 
Plato's teachings. 
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The second chapter of this thesis will trace this positivistic theme 
using the idea of evolutionary theory, from its origin in the writings of 
Heraclitus and Plato, showing the various types of systems models com-
.monly selected by sociologists, and finally outlining the reductional 
process inherent in the concept of the "survival of the fittest". This 
process shows how a total universe of phenomena can be reduced so that 
physical and psychological factors can be rejected as relevant variables 
for sicentific analysis in favour of purely cultural or ideational fac-
tors. Significant to this discussion is Karl Popper's (1975) treatment 
of Darwin's thesis "survival of the fittest" in which Popper shows how 
the development of language and knowledge enabled the development of 
culture to reach a stage where culture could be imputed with a life of 
its own, and a power superior to its creators. The "essence-like" na-
ture thus imparted to culture means that ideology becomes the total 
binding and controlling force of humanity. Much evidence exists today 
to suggest that ideation has achieved such power, and this can be traced 
to the efforts of academic productions. Some examples of this fact con-
cludes chapter two. 
The third and final chapter will be concerned with outlining Emile 
Durkheim's model of the ideal society and the realm of sociology. This 
chapter provides an example of grand utopian theorist in action, and 
qualifies 1J.he discussions of the preceding chapters. It is therefore, 
anticipated that taken as a whole, this thesis will illuminate the back-
ground, functions and realm of concern to which the discipline of socio-
logy is directed. Hopefully, any misconceptions regarding the motives 
and endeavours of some individual sociologists may be dispelled. The 
resulting consequences of these actions, may be assessed at the- discre-
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tion of the individual reader. The views presented here may become more 
meaningful when compared to the reality of social conditions in contem-
porary American society. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION AS REFLECTED IN SOCIETY 
Philosophic or1g1ns are not to be sought for in the cruder 
and conventionalized forms which religious beliefs assumed 
among the populace at large, but rather in the interpreta-
tions of the small intellectural class (Dewey 1957:xviii). 
The Basis of an Evolutionary Perspective 
Throughout the development of sociology emphasis has been placed 
on societal improvement and progress. Congruent with this idea of 
progress is a conception of evolution. As a scientific concept, evo-
lution can only be traced back to the time of Heraclitus (c.544-484). 
Greek Society during Heraclitus' time was continually involved in wars 
of one form or another. Witnessing these events, Heraclitus developed 
the idea of change as his means of explanation. Observing that "every-
thing is in flux and nothing is at rest" Heraclitus. was concerned with 
bringing order to a situation appearing to lack a static edifice or a 
·stable structure (Popper 1971:12). Becoming somewhat fascinated by 
change, Heraclitus concerned himself with its sources, properties, 
directions, and its relation to the principles of organic physis. 
Meaning more than simply growth, physis referred to the principle of 
generation or, more precisely, the generative power in the world, which 
was conceived in the manner of sexual generation. 
Heraclitus was a member of Greek aristocracy, and during his time 
social life was determined by social and religious taboos where each 
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individual had his assigned place within the whole of the social struc-
ture. In this schema every person was conceived as believing his place 
in the social structure was proper, "natural" and assigned to him by 
. the cosmic forces which ruled the world. But, for some reason the an-
cient laws of the city were breaking down, and further research was 
needed to repair the breach. Working with the notion of change, 
Heraclitus was able to conceive that if the physis of a thing is how it 
grows and if everything in the universe, social and physical alike, has 
a physis of its own, then it becomes a simple matter to inquire as to 
what the physis is of each thing--that is to learn ;t-s original con-
clition, its successive stages of development, the influences external 
to it, and its final form, or rather the form which may be said to be 
the ultimate "cause" of it all (see Nisbet 1977:21-23). 
Investigating the "causes" of his crumbling universe, Heraclitus 
compared "the way things grow" to a "moral police". Thereby implying 
that if things do manage to deviate from what is the physis of each, 
retribution should be swift. The problem and the solution therefore 
was obvious, but Heraclitus' fight for order ended in vain. However, 
as we shall see shortly, Plato (c.427-347) found a solution in the de-
velopment of a totally new society. Heraclitus' method of inquiry sug-
gested that the practice for sicence was to observe, compare, and study 
waht is around us and in us. According to him, 
that which encompasses the student will be enough for the 
student of how things grow; seeing it is reasonable and 
intelligent. From the notion of physis as 'moral police' 
as the judgement which steers all things through all • • • 
it is an easy step to the notion of physis as the ideal-
type on which to build schemes of social reform and even 
revolution ..• (Nisbet 1977:24). 
The concept of physis conceived as "growth" became embedded in 
Greek thought, and from it the Romans derived the term natura, which 
generally meant the physical world, including the physical aspects of 
man and society. Inherent in both these concepts is an element of the 
whole from which Heraclitus devised the concept of society "as the 
totality of all events, or changes, or facts" (Popper 1971:12). Thus, 
implying that if something was to be done about the conditions of the 
present then all things must be considered as a whole. Using 
Heraclitus' concepts later Greek philosophers suggested that society 
possessed an ordered nature (see Robinson 1968:78-31). From this con-
cept of "growth" and regularity Aristotle (c.384-322) devised a theory 
of "natural stages" for establishing the origin of society. In his 
Metaphysics Aristotle wrote: the "generation of growing objects [is] 
the first constituent from which a growing object grows. [and 
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this is] the source from which the motion first begins in each natural 
thing, and which belongs to that thing qua that thing" (Nisbet 1977:24 
italics added). When understood this process means that "He who con-
siders things in their first growth and origin, whether the state or 
anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them" (Nisbet 1977:24). 
Applying this theory to practice and assuming that the state can 
be comprehended in terms of its full growth, it seemed imperative that 
attention be given to its origin in time. This means that in the ori-
gin of anything that grows (the state included) is to be found all the 
potentialities of the actual pattern of the growth process. Conceiving 
of the family as being a "species" incorporating various individual 
units united by a common bond Aristotle believed it constituted the 
origin of the state. From it arises "the most natural form of the 
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village [which] appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed 
of children and grandchildren, who are said to be 'suckled with the same 
milk'" (see Nisbet 1977:25). Change from the family to the village is 
. clearly cumulative. When several villages are brought together into a 
single connnunity, the state comes into existence. Therefore, the state 
is emergent of the village in precisely the same·way that the village is 
emergent of the family, and the family presumably of the individual. On 
this point Aristotle is emphatic. 
If the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, 
for it is the end of them, and the completed nature is the 
end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call 
its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a 
family (Nisbet 1977:25). 
Thus, Aristotle concludes, "the state is by nature clearly prior to the 
family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to 
the part • [because] the.individual, when isolated, is not self-
sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole" 
(Nisbet 1977:26 italics added). 
Traditonal Greek Society was identified as a system of diverse 
elements (meaning people), fitting together so harmoniously that the 
system was admirable to behold. Such an organization was obviously to 
be desired, and the "flux" and unrest observed by Heraclitus must some-
how be controlled and eliminated. Society was now seen as breaking-up 
into a connnunity of disunited individual units, and since the "natural 
pattern of growth", grows, obviously in a necessary way, it is only 
necessary that any living thing must grow in the very way prescribed by 
its own nature. It is "necessary" that infancy precede puberty, that 
puberty precede adulthood, and so on. Therefore it is equally 
"necessary," as Aristotle claimed, that monarchy precede oligarchy, 
that oligarchy precede a republican form of government, that democracy 
produce dictatorship in the name of the people (see Nisbet 1977:78). 
Similarly, it is only natural and "necessary" for the diverse elements 
. to be brought into harmony and maintained in orderly relationships \vith 
one another. The key to such a condition was to be found in education. 
31 
Protagoras (c.485-410) suggested education endows children with 
the values they are supposed to possess when they become adult members 
of society (see Robinson 1968:243-4). This idea was also accepted by 
Plato who considered that society arises not from material conditions 
alone but from conditions associated with individual values and conduct. 
In this view society is the result of the social conditioning process 
operating upon the tabula rasa organism, so that when school is 
finished the moral and social laws of a priori society begin to play 
their inescapable educational role for sound citizenship (see Cornford 
1977:27-65, also Berger and Luchmann 1966). Also in this view politi-
cal systems and the moral qualities of individuals grow out of the 
nature of society, and are inculcated (sometimes far more consciously) 
through factors we recognize as cultural. (Later we shall see how 
Emile Durkheim adopted a similar view of education. Chapter 3). Im-
puted to society is a moral task which Aristotle suggests is "to take 
care of virtue [and this] is the business of a state which truly de-
serves this name" (see Popper 1971:112 italics added). To translate 
this view into the language of political demands we find a wish to 
make the state (which is essentially society as distinct from God) an 
object of worship (see Nisbet 1977:81-2, and Popper 1971:111-3). In 
practice Aristotle implies that the officers of the state, namely the 
educating and ruling fraternity 
should be concerned with the morality of the citizens, and 
that they should use their power not so much for the pro-
tection of citizen's freedom as for the control of their 
moral life. In other words, it is the demand that the realm 
of legality, i.e. of state-enforced norms, that should be 
increased at the expense of the realm of morality pro-
per ..• (Popper 1971:113). 
Such an effort is only "natural", because as Plato says in the Laws 
"Every artist . executes the part for the sake of the whole, and 
not the whole for the sake of the part". This is "necessary" because 
"you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the 
sake of you" (see Popper 1971:80-1). 
This briefly was the climate of thought existing when Plato set 
about devising a solution to the problems of Greek society illuninated 
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by the efforts of Heraclitus. In the Republic, written about a century 
after Protagoras, Plato not only interprets society as an instrumental 
organization for meeting human needs and insuring survival (see Cornford 
1977:56-64), but he also sets out his utopian concept for social re-
construction. This was essentially a reconstruction of the ancient 
tribal forms of social organization based on a caste-like class struc-
ture (see Popper 1971:45,89-90). Many needs exist, and many individuals 
possessing varying skills are required to fill them. We all require 
partners and helpers. When these partners and helpers are assembled 
within one community, we have a state. The state is invented out of 
necessity, that is, out of the "natural" needs of mankind to provide 
himself with food, clothing and housing. The personal subsystem sug-
gested by this enumeration includes a husbandman, builder, weaver, 
shoemaker, and many other miscellaneous menials. In this system Plato 
restricted himself to a belief that social diversity could be best con-
trolled by ordering it into specialists based on a division of labour 
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in technological and commercial activities. Maintenance of social order 
could be achieved by consensus of acceptance of this system (see 
Gouldner 1972a:42-5). Such a consensus is based on a belief in 
"justice" and "equality". In the Gorgias Plato "speaks of the view that 
'justice is equality' as one held by the great mass of the people, and 
as one which agrees not only with 'convention', but with 'nature it-
self'" (Popper 1971:91). 
Implied in this system is a belief that each man ought to do only 
those things he does best. Implicit here also, is the belief that if 
one only does what one likes best one will not be competitive in other 
areas of the market place and social conflict would be non-existent. 
Additionally, Plato recognized that society also needed toolmakers, 
carpenters, smiths, shepards, importers, exporters, merchants, and so 
forth just for basic subsistence. But to establish a truly civilized 
State, one must also include actors, dancers, dressmakers, servants, 
tutors, and a military. The latter was necessary for protecting one's 
own land from neighbours who might wish to invade it. 
Thereby, Plato sketches the components for a well-functioning 
State and provides us with a blueprint describing how to assemble these 
components to form an ideal Republic. Change was considered evil and 
in Plato's view "change can be arrested if the state is made an exact 
copy of its original, i.e. of the Form or Idea of the city" (Popper 
1971:86). Therefore, since only things "natural" are Good and Just we 
find in the Republic: 
The law is designed to bring about the welfare of the state 
as a whole, fitting the citizens into one unit, by means of 
both persuasion and force. It makes them all share in what-
ever benefit each of them can contribute to the community. 
And it is actually the law which creates for the state men 
of the right frame of mind; not for the purpose of letting 
them loose, so that everybody can go his own way, but in 
order to utilize them all for welding the city together. 
(Popper 1971:80; see also Cornford 1977:52-3, 233). 
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Heraclitus set out the importance of understanding the diversity of 
the elements in society, and a similar view is implied in Plato's system 
of a new utopia. Such knowledge Plato clearly shows is "necessary" for 
the implementation of a just and proper community. Believing that 
social change occurs as the result of human action, Plato considered 
that disunity was brought about by ambition that originates in the 
yount (see Cornford 1977:273; Popper 1971:40-1). Hence the importance 
of a well organized education for correcting this occurance. The ideal 
or "best state is a kinship of the wisest and most godlike of men. This 
ideal city-state is so near perfection that it is hard to understand how 
it can change" (Popper 1971:29). But as Plato was attempting to show, 
this ideal state could only be set up and maintained by the elimination 
of competition, and providing it was "governed by a young tyrant .•• 
who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator, 
what more could a god do for a city which he wants to make happy?" 
(Popper 1971:44). Here Popper (1971:44) suggests Plato "When speaking 
of the great lawgiver and the young tyrant must have been thinking of 
himself". 
"The philosophies of Parmenides, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle 
can all be appropriately described as attempts to solve the problems of 
that changing world which Heraclitus had discovered" (Popper 1971: 12). 
Further as Popper (1971:35) has claimed: 
Plato was one of the first social scientists and undoubtedly 
by far the most influential. In the sense in which the term 
'sociology' was understood by Comte, Mill, and Spencer, he 
was a sociologist; that is to say, he had successfully 
applied his idealist method to an analysis of the social life 
of man, and of the laws of its development as well as the 
laws and conditions of its stability. 
Karl Popper by no means exhausts the number of sociologists influenced 
by Plato and the Greek philosophers. As a result it is reasonable to 
claim that sociologists by their theories and models of the ideal so-
ciety, are attempting to implement changes in the present social condi-
tions of a better life style. Implicit in these models of the ideal 
society is the inherent importance of the sociologist as guardian of 
the needs and desires of the masses of humanity. The reasons for which 
are related to their position in society as I outlined in the Introduc-
tion. Further, 
We have an insistence that all that has actually happened, 
in the sense of all events and persons in time, has neces-
sarily happened; that, not merely the development of forms 
and types, but the history of events, acts, and motives 
has been necessary (Nisbet 1977:79). 
Plato aimed at setting out "a system of historical periods, governed by 
a law of evolution; in other words, he aimed at a historicist theory of 
society" (Popper 19 71: 40) . 
The Theorist Selects a Perspective 
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Plato conunenced his model of society with a set of categories which 
he considered were the basic elements from which the ideal State could 
be constructed and understood. Further, he imputed to society the 
status of "the Great Being" and this attitude was similarly held by 
Comte (Appelbaum 1970:22) and Durkheim (Durkheim 1974:35-97). Plato's 
categories were the division of labour and technology. By necessity 
then, Plato engaged in an exercise of reduction, a process of selection 
in accordance with his personal ideals and beliefs of his social en-
vironment. All men do this, but our concern here is that persons after 
the mode of Plato deliberately intend to use their ideals for the con-
trol of others. This is a very different purpose from that utilized by 
.most individuals in their everyday action of living. Most construc-
tions of the ideal society, then, are based on the perception that 
ideals are the real essences binding the social milieu, or else, it can 
be said that material factors are the real binding forces. Therefore, 
if we concern ourselves with 11established11 poles and "emergent11 poles 
as a base from which to construct our social models. 
This means that an established situation is one in which all con-
ditions are specifiable and predictable in the action-relevant environ-
ments; and all action-relevant states of the system are specifiable and 
predictable. In this situation available research technology of 
records is considered adequate to provide statements about the probable 
consequences of alternative actions or events. In contrast, an emer-
gent situation is one in which some of these conditions do not prevail 
(see Boguslaw 1961:2;2-19). For example, a multiplication table is an 
established situation as is a table of random numbers (see Popper 
1973:22). A controlled laboratory experiment is devoted to the study 
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of established situations. Most of the work done by unskilled or semi-
skilled labour porbably deals with established situations. A sample 
attitude survey of a population with previously determined characteris-
tics is an established situation analysis. Established situations are 
thus situations specifically imposed at a given time. On the other 
hand, building a house involves dealing with an emergent situation, as 
does creating the multiplication table of the random number table 
before such things existed (see Popper 1973:22). Constructing a social, 
political, or military system to promote world peace and prosperity 
within an environment of such complexity in which available analytic 
techniques cannot provide reasonable probability statements, requires 
emergent situation design. Emergent situations are therefore, situa-
tions for which little or nothing is known prior to investigating them. 
The studies undertaken by Plato and his contemporaries were emergent 
situation analyses. 
It is important to note here that some systems are required to 
deal with established situations, while others are required to deal 
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with emergent situations. However, other systems may be required to 
deal with both established and emergent situations. There are different 
system designers and implicity, if not explicity, differences in their 
answers which imply gross differences in methodology and technique. 
According to Robert Boguslaw (1965:9-23) there are four major approaches 
to system design used by both the classical and the new utopians: the 
Formalist Approach, the Heuristic Approach, the Operating Unit Approach 
and the Ad Hoc Approach. 
Before describing these four approaches to system design, the 
record suggests that sociologists generally tend to place themselves in 
either the category of "historicist" or that of the "social engineer or 
technologist". As we have seen the historicist is inclined to look 
upon social institutions mainly form the point of view of their history; 
their origin, their development, and their present and future signifi-
cance in an endeavour to arrive at some established end. The social 
engineer or technologist on the other hand, will be concerned with 
whether "if such and such are our aims, is this institution well de-
signed and organized to serve them?" (Popper 1971:23). Thus his concern 
will be the social effects of any measure which might be taken in ac-
cordance with a predetermined. end. Both approaches therefore are con-
cerned with ends, (see Popper 1971:22-4,157; and Nisbet 1977:190-1). 
Methodologically, both approaches have a common starting point and a 
common end. The principles generally adopted are: 
if applied to the realm of political activity, demand that we 
must determine our ultimate political aim, or the Ideal State 
before taking any practical action. Only when this ultimate 
aim is determined, in rough outline at least, only when we 
are in possession of something like a blueprint of the society 
at which we aim, only then can we begin to consider the best 
wyas and means for its realization, and to draw up a plan for 
practical action (Popper 1971:157). 
Therefore, the sociologist can if "he wishes to employ only scientifi .... 
cally developed concepts, that is, concepts constructed according to 
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the method instituted by himself;" ensure that his aims are appropriate-
ly established (Durkheim 1962:31-32). 
The Formalist Approach is characterized by the implicit or explicit 
use of models. These models can be of two types: replica and symbolic. 
The replica models provide a pictorial representation in a material 
sense, and resemble the real thing, e.g. biological organisms or 
mechanical objects. The use of these models allows for the expansion 
of the concept physis. "For as things come into being, so must they go 
out ofbeing. Progress and degeneration are the two sides of the same 
cycle of genesis and decay" (Nisbet 1977:61). Such models therefore, 
enable the sociologist to impute "good" and "evil" to certain phenomena,_ 
and similarly to establish what social actions require doctoring 
(Durkheim's Suicide is an example of this). Stages of growth can be 
illustrated more easily and judgements made as to what appears to be 
"best' for humanity. The symbolic models, on the other hand, are in-
tangible and use abstract ideational symbols as representatives for 
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specific objects. Such models do not resemble the real thing in any way, 
e.g. mathematical (graphic or statistical) models. Economists and demo-
graphers commonly use these symbolic models to illustrate and explain 
changing trends. Both models are basically concerned with emergent 
phenomena. 
The Heuristic Approach uses specific principles or guidelines and 
is not bound by preconceptions about the situations the system will 
encounter. Fundamentally, this consists of setting forth general prin-
ciples and insisting that the ideal society must operate in consonance 
with these principles. In reference to Joseph Proudhon's What is 
Property - An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government, 
Robert Boguslm.;r (1965: 15-6) states: "Proudhon did not prepare any blue-
prints for an ideal society". Nevertheless, its principles provide 
action guides for use in the face of completely unanticipated situa-
tions and in situations for which no formal model is available. "The 
techniques are designed to facilitate higher order problem solving by 
computers in such areas as symbolic logic and chess"-like maneuvers 
(Boguslaw 1965: 13). Such an approach can be applied to both established 
and emergent phenomena, but tends to be applied to emergent situations 
using established data. 
The Operating Unit Approach begins neither with models of the sys-
tem nor selected principles, but with people or machines carefully 
selected or tooled to possess certain performance characteristics. The 
system, or organization, or utopia that ultimately unfolds will incor-
porate solutions that these units provide. Man may be inflexible, ma-
chines may be flexible or vice versa, but "under some conditions, it 
may be highly desirable to limit the range of operating unit flexibility 
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to insure reliability and predictability of system performance. Under 
other conditions the reverse may be true" (Boguslaw 1965:17). The fie-
tiona! utopia of B. F. Skinner's Walden Two provides an illustration of 
this system. Reliability in performance is achieved through condi-
tioning or deliberately altering the "natural" phenomena to behave in a 
"reasonable" and acceptable fashion. Such an approach deals with an 
established situation using established data. 
The Ad Hoc Approach is a classificatory system and involves no com-
mitment to models, principles, or operating units; but consists of more 
or less arbitrary classes constructed for the sake of summarizing data. 
No attempt is made to fit classes to data in order to summarize the 
relationships between variables. The classes are independent of one 
another. This is essentially a method of organizing observations so 
that more sophisticated theory development can follow. This approach 
proceeds with a view of present or established reality as being the 
only constant in the equation. The design process characteristically 
begins with a review of an existing system, and its subsequent course 
is, at every state, a function of the then existing situation. The 
conceptual state of this approach is by far the least developed and 
usually derives from empirical phenomena. 
It is frequently adopted when a future system is more or less 
clearly perceived by· the system designer and the problem is 
one of implementation. Under these circumstances the ad hoc 
approach is us.ed as a means of moving from the current state 
of affairs to the desired system state (Boguslaw 1965:21). 
The salient feature of this situation is the existence of a problem for 
which not solution currently exists. The system is based on the concept 
of Darwinian evolution and the situational problem is resolved in any 
viable manner that ensures survival. The remaining configuration is 
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logically assessed as being the most successful adaptation to the en-
vironment. Concern here, is with established situations for purposes of 
prediction. To arrive at this situation it becomes necessary that 
To understand the system we must obtain data through time. 
We must, in point of fact, engage in what might be termed 
a historical or genetic investigation. We must understand 
what they are at the present in terms of how they arrived 
at the present (Boguslaw 1965:149). 
My description of these model approaches is necessarily brief, but, 
I feel, sufficient to reveal the possibilities available for the resear-
cher and theorist. The various methods available to the historicist and 
the social engineer or technologist are such taht any one whole approach 
may be followed or a combination of all possible approaches may be se-
lected. I stated in the previous chapter that most grand theorists from 
the Greeks to the present day pursued an evolutionary and functional 
approach in building their utopias. Therefore, if we accept the fact, 
as does Kingsley Davis (1959), that academic sociology and functionalism 
are not dissimilar (see also Gouldner 1971b:373-411), then we might 
reasonably suggest that we are dealing with a combination of the For-
malist and Ad Hoc Approaches. Emile Durkheim's work exemplifies this 
dual approach. As we shall see in the next chapter, Durkheim's ap~ 
proach was concerned with the search for optimal solutions to problems 
involved in the operation of a system, namely society as a whole. By 
constructing an organic model of the established system using an emer-
gent situation perspective he was able to impute from his model an 
intended result. "Validating" his results by use of a comparative 
method Durkheim was doing 
hardly more than a shoring-up of the idea of progressive de-
velopment generally, and more particularly, of the belief that 
the recent history of the West could be taken as evidence of 
the direction in which mankind as a whole move and, flowing 
from this, should move (Nisbet 1977:190-1) 
What is Evolution? 
Basically, evolution is another term for change. But at the same 
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time, evolution is more than that; it is also a process (growth) and an 
idea. In so far as the idea of evol~tion has come to be conceived of by 
social evolutionists it refers to: 
The naturalness of change to each social institution or system, 
as well as to the whole of society; the directional for trend-
like character of change; the emanation of change from forces 
internal; the genetic continuity of change; the necessity of 
natural change upon uniform, persisting forces throughout 
time (Nisbet 1977:187-8). 
But in so far as the concept was conceived of by Charles Darwin 
(1858) and his contemporary Alfred Russel Wallace (1838) it referred to 
a biological life process. The former view is built upon precisely that 
conception of organic growth derived from the Greek word physis and the 
Roman word natura. This conception according to Robert Nisbet (1977: 
164) means that: "Such growth is not the model of Darwinian natural 
selection or of post-Darwinian theory in biology. Such growth is the 
model of the theory of social evolution--and it remains so even today 
in the social sciences". 
During his travels around the world, especially in the "Beagle" 
(1832=1836) Darwin observed that varying types of plants and animals 
encountering limited food supply must compete. Those most successful 
and best adapted to their environment therefore, left more off-spring 
for the next generation. Darwin could not explain the diversity of the 
species from which change came; he could only observe it. This process 
Darwin labelled "natural selection". Not until he had read An Essay on 
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the Principle of Population by Thomas Malthus (1798) was Darwin able to 
offer an explanation. Malthus suggested that the reporductive potential 
of mankind was far in excess of the natural resources available to 
nourish an expanding population. Malthus further suggested that in 
practice the size of populations is limited by such lethal factors as 
disease, famine, and war, and that such factors alone appeared to check 
what would otherwise be an expanding population. 
Darwin realized then that the individuals that in fact survived 
must for that reason be in some way better equipped to live in their 
environment than those which did not survive. Thus it followed that in 
a natural interbreeding population any variation would most likely be 
preserved that increased the organism's ability to leave fertile off-
spring, while the variations that decreas.ed that ability would most 
likely be eliminated. Therefore, only a proportion of individuals in a 
population survive long enough to reach maturity and in turn bear off-
spring. The environment itself determines the fate of each and, in 
destroying a proportion, selects the remainder. Through its effect 
upon each individual the environment controls to a decisive extent the 
direction and rate of evolution, and for that reason it may be con-
sidered to be one creative factor in the process of evolutionary change. 
Important in this regard is the fact that evolution implies a change 
over time, historically, or from generation to generation as a natural-
ly evolving condition. 
Although natural selection acts on individuals, it is the popula-
tion of the species that evolves (Simpson 1958:14), since the genetic 
plan of an individual is unalterable and remains constant throughout 
its life. It is not my purpose here to explain this process through 
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the complications of genetics but just to mention its importance in the 
operation of biological evolution (see Dobzhansky 1962; Campbell 1974). 
Importantly, the reader at this point, is to note the change of emphasis; 
from the individual to the collectivity. I shall deal with this impor-
tant feature of the evolutionary process shortly. The theory presented 
by Darwin and Wallace can be stated as four propositions and three de-
ductions. Both these propositions (P) and deductions (D) have been 
defined by Bernard Campbell (1974:8) as follows: 
P.I. Organisms produce a far greater number of reproductive 
cells, and, indeed, young individuals, than ever give rise 
to mature individuals. 
P.2. The number of individuals in populations and species 
remains more or less constant over long periods of time. 
D. I. Therefore there must be a high rate of mortality both 
among reproductive cells and among immature individuals. 
P.3. The individuals in a population are not all identical 
but show variation in all characters, and the individuals 
that survive by reason of their particular sets of charac-
ters will become the parents of. the next generation. 
D.2. Therefore the characters of those surviving organisms 
sill in some way have made them better adapted to survive 
in the conditions of their environment. 
P.4. Offspring resember parents closely but not exactly. 
D.3. Therefore subsequent generations will maintain and 
improve on the degree of adaptation realized, by gradual 
changes in every generation. 
The evolving species.Homo developed a socio-cultural system of 
adaptation to his natural surroundings, and this process is as important 
to an understanding of humanity as is biological evolution. Darwin's 
thesis was based on his observation of the adaptation of plants and 
animals other than man. Therefore, in attempting to understand humanity, 
socio-cultural evolution may present a more fruitful area for concentra-
tion. But like the biological process, socio-cultural evolution is a 
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process of gradual change and development that is based on individual 
experiences. The two forms of evolution are not different facets of a 
single phenomenon, but are separate and distinct processes. At the 
same time, there are important links between the two modes of evolution. 
An examination of human evolution shows us that biological evolution 
produced the species, Homo sapiens (Modern Man), that now creates and 
uses symbol systems to build cultures, and in this sense socio-cultural 
systems, and their evolution as well, are productions of biological 
evolution. 
To summarize this process; both the genetic alphabet and symbol 
systems provide a population with the means of acquiring, sotring, 
transmitting, and using information; and, both are mechanisms through 
which change occurs in a population. A symbol system, therefore, is 
the functional equipment of the gnetic alphabet. 
These two evolutions operate in comparable ways and produce compar-
able results. Significantly, evolution involves the interaction of 
populations and their environments. Environments, as the term has been 
used so far, refers to ~he physical environment, which in the case of 
man must also include social factors. The understanding of the change 
factor brought about by the evolutionary process, may be facilitated by 
a comparison of contemporary human societies with their appearance only 
a few generations ago. However, if we turn from this present age of 
social and cultural diversity to that era hundreds of thousands. of 
years ago when every human society was a small band of nomadic hunters 
and gatherers with relatively little distinguishing differences between 
them; or for that matter, from the societies of other anthropoids, the 
effect of evolution can be more readily grasped. Therefore, it is easy 
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to conceive of human society as evolving through a series of stages of 
development, with one stage producing the next, as adaptational infor-
mation banks correspondingly increase in volume. Present human society 
could quite easily be considered as the pinnacle of such a development. 
What i~ Evolutionary Theory? 
The reader has probably already assumed that inherent in the evo-
lutionary process is a concept of direction seemingly suggestive of 
linear progression; from lower to higher, or from primitive to modern. 
This is like saying those who evolve and survive are good, and those 
who did not were bad and so they died. In any event, this concept ap-
pears to be the view taken by many evolutionary theorists, especially 
those grand theorists of the classical mold. In adducing empirical 
evidence in support of these theories, evolutionists often speak of 
evolution as being inherent in culture taken as a whole. Their ap-
proach is what Julian Steward (1953: 315, 1955:4, 14) has called "univer-
sal evolution". If the sequence of stages is meant to apply to the 
totality of culture, then its empirical support must be found in this 
unit, and it can be applicable to this unit only. That is, stages such 
as "Primitive", "Chieftan", "Feudal", and "Modern" are considered to 
stem from certain conditions present in a preceding state (see Childe 
1946: 17). Such a progression does however, indicate and a priori con-
struct, which becomes attractive chiefly because it puts our own cul-
ture at the top of the growth pyramid. Our own culture in this sequence 
bears a connotation of being the "best" adapter. 
In other contexts however, we find evolutionists referring not to 
the totality of human culture, but to the development of particular 
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cultures. When the sequence is meant to be applicable to all cultures, 
we may call the theories "unilinear evolution" or to use Steward's term 
"universal evolution". Such schemes, if they are to be valid for par-
ticular cultural histories, must be derived from a comparison of the 
historical developments of a sizeable sample of the world's cultures. 
On the other hand, if an evolutionary scheme refers to a limited class 
of cultures, or the one cultural area over time, then the data need only 
refer to a convincing sample of the class in question. In such cases we 
may apply Julian Steward's (1955) term "multilinear evolution". 
The "less progressive" or "less industrialized" societies of our 
generation are as much a part of the totality of human culture as is 
Euro-American culture (any introductory Anthropology text documents this 
fact). Each society has changed, each in its own way over the years. 
Certain changes which have occurred in the prehistory and history of 
mankind as a whole can be considered as steps made tm.;rard the present 
condition of each and every culture on earth. This must be granted 
when one concedes that all "stages" extending from the beginning of 
man's history to the present state of each society. For, given the 
entire life-history of the whole of mankind, it seems likely that each 
culture can have its own criteria for progress or change, and its own 
evolution, and can place itself at the pinnacle of the cultures on earth 
if it so wishes. Evolutionists studying these various cultures could, 
if they are interested in cycles, select facets of culture which would 
give them cyclical narratives. But if their interests are in "progress"; 
then a simple-to-complex development is the outcome; with appropriate 
definitions of "simple" and "complex". The sequence thus need only pass 
from that which is most unlike their own culture, though those aspects 
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that are similar to it, to the apex, whatever that might be. The pur~ 
pose of the evolutionist is salient in this scheme of things, and omni-
present in evolutionary theory is the view that the present condition of 
any society is the most complex in a chronological sequence of adapta-
tions. But why one of these many cultures is selected as being more 
advanced than the others will be explained later. 
Earlier it was noted that "The thing that is actually evolving is a 
population11 (Simpson 1958:14), and it is in this light that evolutionary 
theory should be understood. As Gerhard Lenski (1977:557) states: 
11 Evolutionary theory is designed to provide answers to questions about 
fundamental trends in history; it was never intended to provide explana-
tions of the actions of all the individuals who, collectively, create 
the trend". Although evolutionary theory is a grand theory, it must be 
acknowledged as having "Specific'' and "General" features, as Marshall 
Sahlins (1970) makes perfectly clear. 
On the one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modi-
fication: new forms differentiate from old. On the other 
side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, 
and surpress, lower. The first of these directions is Speci-
fic Evolution, and the second, General Evolution (Sahlins 
1970: 12-13). 
The distinction drawn here is that "any given change in a form of life 
or culture can be viewed either in the perspective of adaptation or from 
the point of view of overall progress . . . the context is very impor-
tant" (Sahlins 1970:13). To state this more simply, 
General cultural evolution, •.. is passage from less to 
greater energy transformation, lower to higher levels of 
integration, and less to greater all-round adaptability. 
Specific evolution is the phylogenetic, ramifying, historic 
passage of culture along its many lines, the adaptive modi-
fication of particular cultures (Sahlins 1970:38). 
---------
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In this view, evolution in its specific (phylogenetic) aspect is multi-
linear; and evolution in its general or universal aspect is unilinear 
(see White 1970:viii-ix). 
Multilinear evolution according to Richard Applebaum (1970:57) "is 
more of a methodology than a coherent set of propositions, arid, in fact, 
its principal task appears to be a taxonomy rather than explanation". 
Thus it is concerned with accumlating data on individual cultures and 
the changes taking place in their histories as its specific area of 
emphasis. "Human evolution then, is not merely a matter of biology, but 
of the interaction of man's physical and cultural characteristics, each 
influencing the other" (Steward 1964:139). Unilinear evolution on the 
other hand, is more a theoretical construct concerned with explaining 
trends in world history, based on facts gathered by a multilinear evo-
lutionist. Both, then, adhere to a similar theme, and differ only in 
methodological emphasis (Applebaum 1970:58-9). 
Earlier it was stated that evolution was, among other things, an 
idea. Of necessity then, as ideas, evolutionary sequences are abstrac-
tions from established reality in which a perceived element of progress 
exists. In his The Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte (1821-50) care-
fully explained that these "abstractions" were history divorced from all 
particularity of the events, actions, personages, places, and periods 
which was the very substance of the historian's concern. Therefore, by 
"abstract history" Comte meant precisely a method for the study of 
human evolution, progress, or development (see Nisbet 1977:165). Never-
theless, evolution ·also means change, and change according to Robert 
Nisbet (1972: 1) "is a succession of differences in time in a persisting 
identity". The three equally vital elements of that definition are: 
"differences", "in time", and "persisting identity". Further, if the 
idea of evolution as it is implied in a multilinear approach is a 
methodology and not a theory as Richard Appelbaum suggests, in the 
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sense of being a "theoretical generalization", the idea must be more ap-
parent in a unilinear approach to evolution. To repeat again, the idea 
of progress as Marshal Sahlins (1970:35-37) points out, is the passage 
from less to greater energy transformation; the passage from lower to 
higher levels of integration; and greater adaptability. Therefore, we 
find implied here, as was the case with Darwin's "natural selection", a 
concern with establishing the most adaptive condition as an ideal for 
which all cultures or species may strive. It is no coincidence then, 
that Sahlins (1970:37) should state: "So modern national culture tends 
to spread around the globe". "Modern national culture" of course being 
the present Euro-Arnerican culture. Auguste Comte opted for such a 
situation, and similar positions are implied in all utopian models of 
society. Not only are modern sociology and functionalism seen as one, 
but the idea of evolution becomes an invaluable tool for establishing 
a base for which such ideal models of society can be constructed (see 
Collingwood 1976:128-9). 
Evolution of the Idea of Culture 
Before Darwin it was customary to view organisms as divinely 
created and therefore perfect solutions to the problems of life on this 
planet. Associated with this perfect creation the Greek's devised the 
idea of growth (physis), which evolved cyclically via a series of 
natural stages from generation to generation. The organism man evolved 
this way and in a like manner so assumably did society. During the 
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nineteenth century awareness of; the numerous mistakes in this life pro-
cess became a matter of academic concern bec~use this process was not a 
carefully planned and meticulously performed attempt to realized an aim 
that had been thought out in advance by some ecclesiastical being. The 
life process was in fact, seen as often unreasonable, wasteful, and it 
produced an immense variety of forms that left to nature the selection 
for elimination of the unadapted. Some of the remaining forms were sur-
prisingly efficient as if they had been planned with a definite aim in 
mind, but there was no consistency and the operation of natural selec-
tion was not eliminating all the maladjusted. The question posed by 
this situation was, if the life on our planet was divinely created 
should not all species be perfect? Obviously they were not, because 
everywhere one could observe maladjustment and dysfunctioning members of 
all species existing along side more perfect examples. During this time 
the human condition was chaotic in Europe just as it had been in Greece 
during the time of Heraclitus and Plato and their contemporaries. Con-
cerned with this situation in much the same way that the Greeks had 
been, many statesmen and academics considered that a programme of recon-
struction was needed if the ills were to be eliminated. Nature there-
fore needed some assistance. 
The importance of Darwin's thesis on "natural selection" and the 
survival of the fittest to this academic climate was obviously substan-
tial as Collingwood (1976:128-9) points out. The idea showed that the 
mechanism of natural selection can, in principle, stimulate the actions 
of the Creator, and His purpose and design, and accordingly stimulate 
rational human action directed towards righteous purpose or aim. Thus, 
Darwin's theory showed that it was possible to reduce teleology to 
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causation by explaining, in purely physical terms, the existence of a 
natural design and purpose in the world. In this principle, any parti-
cular teleological explanation may be reduced to, or further explained 
by, a causal explanation. 
Although it is true that the mass of the physical object cannot be 
reduced, and that laws about mass cannot be reduced to geometrical laws, 
nevertheless, mass is autonomous with respect to geometrical properties. 
We should not, on that account, separate the mass of an object from its 
shape and transport it into a separate category. But then is this al-
ways true? Admittedly, a physical object would then not be in a cate-
gory of actually existing material things, but an abstraction, and with 
the collaboration of various abstract categories symbolically construc-
ted, we might thereby arrive at something that can aspire to be accep-
table as "the very standard of reality". 
It is true however, that we can always abstract from the particular 
properties of a physical system and concentrate, say, on its energy, 
just as an economist "abstracts" from the height, weight, intelligence, 
and sex appeal of people and considers their economical behaviour only. 
In a similar manner a sociologist can view the whole of society and 
concentrate on its energy and "abstract" from perceived social, techno-
logical, philosophic, and sentimental factors, and consider "technology 
is the basis of all other sectors of culture" (White 1959:27). This 
does not mean that the economist's, physicist's or sociologist's abstrac-
tions can be regarded in anyway as aspects or properties of these bodies. 
Quite the contrary,·it is essential to remember that they are such as-
pects, that they do belong to the physical world or the whole enterprise 
ceases to make sense. Important in this scheme is the classification of 
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humans as physical objects in that their economic products, or the 
calculation of energy spectra, can be emphaslzed as the elements neces-
sary only for analyzing cultural and social change. Therefore, there is 
no reason why the argument so presented should stop short of logic, 
because abstractions, far from being excluded from the physical world, 
must always be referred back to the physical situation from which they 
arose, or for that matter from which they were designed if we accepted 
a "natural design", and of which they form an essential part. In rela-
tivity energy has mass and the same may be true of concepts. 
We noted in the last chapter that society or culture was the realm 
to which sociology applies itself. We noted there also, that sociology 
in its quest for explanation of natural symbols, laws and regularities 
existing in a society or culture would, once found and established, 
offer a natural system for discerning social phenomena. All social 
phenomena is the product of a set of interacting individuals who over 
time build-up a bank of knowledge from which further accumulations of 
knowledge are derived and likewise stored. This search for systems of 
explanation by necessity means that the theorist naturally reduces the 
total universe of social phenomena to manageable proportions. His final 
selections are then usually presented as having a priori common sense 
validity. The theorist essentially "consists in the establishment of a 
social and moral order sui generis" (Durkheim 1960:61). How a theorist 
in the mold of Durkheim reduces the total social universe to a select 
number of categories and imputes to them an existence sui generis, is 
the concern of this section. 
Karl Popper (1975) in Of Clouds and Clocks attempted to restate the 
theory of evolution presented by Charles Darwin and show how it related 
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to ideational construction. Some of the ideas adduced in this paper by 
Popper are pertinent to the explanation of how the social environment can 
be controlled simply by the creation of a static edifice. Such an edi-
fice eluded the Greeks, and the importance of the idea of evolution and 
the sociologist in the present pursuit of this end will be addressed. 
Popper (1975:242-4) outlines twelve theses of Darwin's evolutionary 
perspective which are as follows: 
(1) All organisms are constantly, day and night, engaged in 
problem-solving; and so are all those evolutionary sequences 
of organisms--the phyla which begin with the most primitive 
forms and of which the now living organisms are the latest 
members. 
(2) These problems are problems in an objective sense; they 
can be, hypothetically, reconstructed by hindsight, as it 
were. (I will say more about this later.) Objective pro-
blems in this sense need not have their conscious counter-
part; and where they have their conscious counterpart, the 
conscious problem need not coincide with the objective prob-
lem. 
(3) Problem-solving always proceeds by the method of trial and 
error: new reactions, new forms, new organs, new modes of 
behaviour, new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward and 
controlled by error-elimination. 
(4) Error-elimination may proceed either by the complete 
elimination of unsuccessful forms (the killing-off of unsuc-
cessful forms by natural selection) or by the (tentative) 
evolution of controls which modify or suppress unsuccessful 
organs, or forms of behaviour, or hypotheses. 
(5) The single organism telescopes into one body, as it were, 
the controls developed during the evolution of its phylum--
just as it partly recapitulates, in its ontogenetic develop-
ment, it phylogenetic evolution. 
(6) The single organism is a kind of spearhead of the evolu-
tionary sequence of organisms to which it belongs (its 
phylum): it is itself a tentative solution, probing into 
new environmental niches, choosing an environment and modi-
fying it. It is thus related to its phylum almost exactly as 
the actions (behaviour) of the individual organism, and its 
behaviour, are both trials, which may be eliminated by error-
elimination. 
(7) Using 'P for problem, 'TS' for tentative solutions, 'EE' 
for error-elimination, we can describe the fundamental evolu-
. tionary sequence of events as follows: 
P -+ TS -+ EE -+ P 
But this sequence is not a cycle: the second problem is, in 
general, different from the first: it is the result of the 
new situation which has arisen, in part, because of the tenta-
tive solutions which have been tried out, and the error-elimi-
nation which controls them. In order to indicate this, the 
above schema should be .rewritten: 
(8) But even in this form an important element is still 
missing: the multiplicity of the tentative solutions, the 
multiplicity of the trials. Thus our final schema becomes 
something like this: 
;;r TS 1 ':>1. 





(9) In this form, our schema can be compared with that of 
Neo-Darwinism. According to Neo-Darwinism there is in the 
main one problem: the problem of survival. There is, as 
in our system, a multiplicity of tentative solutions--the 
variations or mutations. But there is only one way of 
error-elimination--the killing of the organism. And (partly 
for this reason) the fact that P1 and P2 will differ essen-
tially is overlooked, or else its fundamental importance is 
not sufficiently clearly realized. 
(10) In our system, not all problems are survival problems: 
there are many very ~pecific problems and sub-problems (even 
though the earliest problems may have been sheer survival 
problems). For example an early problem P1 may be repro-
cution. Its solution may lead to a new problem, Pz: the 
problem of getting rid of, or spreading, the offspring--
the children which threaten to suffocate not only the parent 
organism but each other. 
It is perhaps of interest to note that the problem of avoiding 
suffociation by one's offspring may be one of those problems 
which was solved by the evolution of multicellular organisms: 
instead of getting rid of one's offspring, one establishes a 
common economy, with various new methods of living together. 
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(11) The theory here proposed distinguishes between P1 and Pz, 
and it shows that the problems (or the problem situations) 
which the organism is trying to deal wiLh are often new, and 
·arise themselves as products of the evolution. The theory 
thereby gives implicitly a rational account of what has usual-
ly been called by the somewhat dubious names of 'creative 
evolution' or 'emergent evolution'. 
(12) Our schema allows for the development of error-elimi-
nating controls (warning organs like the eye; feedback 
mechanisms); that is, controls which can eliminate errors 
without killing the organism; and it makes it possible, ulti-
mately, for our hypotheses to die in our stead. 
The theory of evolution described here consists of a certain view 
of evolution as being a growing hierarchical system of "plastic" con-
trols, and a view of organisms as incorporating: or as in the case of 
culture, evolving exosomatically. Emphasis is placed on the fact that 
"mutations" may be interpreted as more or less accidental trial-and-
error action, and "natural selection" is one way of controlling these 
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actions by error-elimination. Some attempt will be made here to explain 
these theses in more detail. 
As Karl Popper (1975:245) points out; "Each organism can be re-
garded as a hierarchical system of plastic controls--as a system of 
clouds controlled by clouds". The controlled subsystems make trial-and-
error movements which are partly suppressed and partly restricted by the 
controlling system. An example of this can be seen in the relations 
between the lower and higher members of the animal kingdom. The lower 
ones continue to exist and to play their part in the biotic community, 
but they are constrained and controlled by the higher ones in the food 
chain. More specifically, the physical force of gravity acts as a 
plastic control over our abilities to stand erect. In a similar manner, 
the atmosphere controls climatic and vegetational conditions around the 
world. 
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These examples illustrate the thesis first stated by Popper where 
each organism is considered to be continually engaged in problem-solving 
by trial-and-error actions. The chance-like nature of these actions 
being such, that if they are unsuccessful they are eliminated. The 
problem is one of survival. Such a proposition ignores the fact that 
even though the trails appear randomly assigned there must be at least 
an "after-effect", for the organism is constantly learning from its 
mistakes, and establishes controls which suppress or eliminate, or at 
least reduce the frequency of certain possible trials. Successful 
learning processes increase the probability of the survival of mutations 
which "stimulate" the solutions so reached, and tend to make the solu-
tion hereditary, by incorporating it into the spatial structure or form 
of the new organisms. The process of adaptation is always conditioned 
by the environment even in the case of human beings; but in their case, 
exosomatic growth changes the physical environment of the organism, and 
socializes it. Success then is an organismic achievement, and the type 
of social envirnoment created is the result of human acgion. 
In these theses Popper proposes a theory of evolution that entails 
a Darwinian epstemology and explains knowledge as an ever-changing 
"exosomatic" product of the organism, as a kind of secretion that is 
constantly modified and augmented by trial and error procedures that 
protects the organism from being modified itself. Knowledge is a pro-
duct of man, which can be changed by man, but is still objective and 
even autonomous; that is, it cannot be reduced to either physical or 
mental processes. It is objective because it obeys laws of its own 
that are independent of the intentions of its creators. Having been 
produced by man it no longer obeys all his wishes. Knowledge is 
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autonomous because these laws are neither physical laws, nor mental laws, 
nor reducible to physical and/or mental laws. Thus, in Popper's schema 
the phenomenon of knowledge shows that the physical world in an open 
world and that some of its inhabitants are affected by physical as well 
as by non-physical or mental influences. 
To facilitate better understanding of the importance of knowledge 
to Popper's evolutionary process, his concepts of "physical", "mental", 
and "non-physical" worlds need to be explained. These three different 
types of entities are presented as: the world of physical objects, or 
World 1; the world of mental processes, or Horld 2; and the products of 
the human mind, or World 3 (Popper 1975:74,106-7). "By 'World 1' I mean 
what is usually called the world of physics, of rocks, and trees and 
physical fields of forces" (Popper 1973:20). To be more specific, 
Popper (1975:37) states: 
there are many sorts of real things • • • foodstuffs • . • or 
more resistent objects ..• like stones, and trees, and 
humans. But there are many sorts of reality which are quite 
different, such as our subjective decoding of our experiences 
of foodstuffs, stones, and trees, and human bodies .••• 
Examples of other sorts in this many-sorted universe are: a 
toothache, a word, a language, a highway code, a novel, a 
governmental decision; a valid or invalid proof; perhaps for-
ces, fields of forces •.. structures; and regularities. 
We might also add, ghosts, numbers, spirits, gods, God and the Devil; 
because they "are either minds endowed with innnortal bodies or else pure 
minds, in contrast to ourselves" (Popper 1975:153). 
With regard to Horlds 2 and 3 Popper (1973:20) says: 
By 'World 2' I mean the psychological world, the world of 
feelings, of fear and of hope, of dispositions to act, and 
of all kinds of subjective experiences •.•. By 'World 3' I 
mean the world of the products of the human mind. Although 
I include works of art in World 3 and also ethical values 
and social institutions (and, thus, one might say, socie-
ties), I shall confine myself largely to the world of scien-
tific problems and to theories, including mistaken theories. 
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All concrete physical bodies belong to World 1 and absrract things 
belong to World 3 phenomena. Popper's system of clouds referred to 
earlier, being abstract forces, are therefore contained in World 3. 
The ordering of these three worlds shows a historical progression. 
Popper (1973:21) therefore assumes: 
that the physical world existed before the world of animal 
feelings; and [he] suggests that World 3 only beings with the 
evolution of specifically human language ..•• I will take 
the world of linguistically formulated human knowledge as being 
most characteristic of World 3 •... I will also assume that 
World 3 has a history. 
Further Popper (1973:22) contends that: 
a thought, once it is formulated in language, becomes an 
object outside ourselves, •.. and with it emerges the human 
World 3, the world of objective standards and the contents of 
our objective thought processes. 
Human knowledge which includes plans, problerils, theories, and solu-
tions of problems as Popper (1975:230) contends are "something quite 
abstract". Abstract entities such as numbers, concepts, etc. cannot 
have a causal influence upon physical processes, yet human knowledge has 
transformed the physical world. There must, therefore, exist processes 
that mediate between World 3 and World 1 phenomena. These processes 
can be neither abstract, nor material. But they must be capable of 
acting on World 1 and being acted upon by World 3. Now we know that 
"we must normally grasp, or understand a World 3 theory before we can 
use it to act upon World 1" (Popper 1973:21), so that, grasping, 
thinking, understanding seem to be the mediating processes we are 
looking for. It follows also, that they cannot be material processes, 
but must form an autonomous domain between World 1 and World 3, and 
this domain is naturally World 2. It is the discovery of human know-
ledge that makes us realize that the physical world is an open system 
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in the sense that it can be changed by non-physical influences, and 
that mental processes are among such influences and consequently form 
World 2 phenomena (Popper 1973:26). In a biological sense then, evolu-
tion is clearly not a conscious process, but in a cultural sense evolu-
tion does become conscious. To extrapolate the concept of "survival of 
the fittest" to mean the ideal type: the desirable product of achieve-
ment, problem solving in the biological evolutionary model and the 
cultural model are based on the difference between rational and irration-
al actions. For example, using this argument we might accept that the 
amoeba's actions are not rational, while we may assume that human 
actions are. The observable difference that tends to support this 
contention is the existence or non-existence of exosomatic extensions, 
and it is in this light that the human species is set apart from other 
species. 
Nevertheless, all organisms, even amoebas, face "objective problems" 
which "need not have their conscious counterpart; and where they have 
their conscious counterpart, the conscious problem need not coincide 
with the objective problem" (Popper 1975:242). For problems of this 
kind are created by the physical surroundingo of the organism; however, 
they can also arise from the transformations which the organism effects 
in these surroundings and which have often unintended side effects, so 
that, the transformations "may create a new need, or a new set of aims" 
(Popper 1975:117). Therefore, either can act back upon the organism, or 
at least they have the potentiality of so acting and "this potentiality 
or disposition may exist without ever being • • • realized" (Popper 
1975: 116). "A wasp's nest [or a cultural artifact] is a wasp's nest 
[or a cultural artifact] even after it has been deserted" (Popper 1975: 
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115 italics added), and apart from being a certain physical structure it 
also offers advantages, or resistances to properly equipped organisms, 
and it offers these advantages and these resistances even if there are 
no organisms around to profit from them, or to be disturbed by them. 
Thus, the interactions between an animal and its surroundings give rise 
to a whole "universe of possibilities and potentialities • • • [to] a 
world which is [both] more abstract than the world of physical bodies", 
and to a large extent also autonomous (Popper 1975:116 italics added). 
In the case of man, we have physical products such as books, libraries, 
etc., and these physical products are used in various ways (Popper 1975: 
115). Importantly, the "power", or the disposition, or the potentiality 
of these physical objects is that they can be understood, or misunder-
stood, interpreted, or misinterpreted even if there is no one around who 
does the understanding and the interpreting. The fact that archeologists 
are able to interpret fossil remains of ancient civilizations provides a 
good example of this situation. 
The important point emphasized here is that it is the powers of the 
objects and not the objects themselves that form "a new universe" of 
autonomous entities. The distinction here is between value and being, 
or to use Max Scheler's terminology, "in the realm of essences" beyond 
the physical world of man's experience (Staude 1967:21-211). The power 
inherent in the content of books and libraries, for example, is such 
that these objects possess the power to make organisms act in a certain 
way and this "power" resembles "a system of clouds controlled by clouds" 
and thereby makes World 1 and World 3 coincide. This is so, because 
Man, as a composite of spirit and matter, of mind and instinc.;.. 
tual drives, [can] .•• infuse spirit into the world of matter 
by shaping it according to his ideals. In itself, the world of 
essences, the ideal realm, remain[s] pure potentiality. That 
is, in itself, it remained impotent ... [until] actualized 
by man (Stuade 1967:211 italics added). 
Birds sit on stones, fences, trees, and man reads the will of the gods 
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in tea leaves, in the stars, and so on. These objects produce abstrac-
tions which have the power of reality and should be considered for the 
part they play in the evolutionary process. 
The world of an organism is a natural world, and it acts blindly. 
On the other hand, the world of a theory is a social world, and is built 
up by humans who have to decide what to keep and what to eliminate. 
Thus, we ask ourselves, is the decision to be made completely arbitrary, 
or is it supposed to proceed according to explicit rules and, if the 
latter, which rules shall we choose? These are the questions which 
arise once we start relying on methods of elimination instead of looking 
for methods of justification~ Natural selection thus becomes a non-ran-
dam process in the cultural realm of man, and often his aims and deci-
sions are not motivated by reasons of survival alone. 
Returning to Popper's first three theses where we are concerned 
with the difference between rational and irrational actions, we find 
that with the ability to think and act accordingly, human actions pro-
ceed as a series of trial-and-errors as he tests mental constructs or 
hypotheses of conceived phenomena until he arrives at an expected condi-
tion. These mental constructs are formulated in words, and often 
expressed in writing. By doing so man is able to look for flaws in any 
one of his hypotheses, by criticizing it, and testing it, and eventually 
with the help of other humans he will be able to consciously select one 
as the most desirable. As Popper (1968:Chapter 10) asserts, we choose 
what we consider the "best" of a set of competing hypotheses in this 
way and hopefully arrive "nearest to the truth". 
Humans have the ability to abstract from the conditions of their 
physical surrounding regularities and subjective meanings that when 
examined objectively allow them to make decisions on which to act. 
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Such an ability is not available to the amoeba or most other animal 
species, and so it happens, more often than not, that natural selection 
eliminates a mistaken hypothesis or expectation by eliminating those 
organisms which hold to it. Therefore, the organism either adapts or 
dies because it cannot change its physical surroundings. But because 
of man's ability to change his physical environment by the use of exoso-
matic extensions, he is able to exist knowing "our hypotheses die in our 
stead: a case of exosomatic evolution" (Popper 1975:248). 
The next series of Popper's theses: four to eight, are concerned 
with the development of control mechanisms. We find that emphasis is an 
error-elimination, and to succeed in this endeavour some form of control 
mechanism is necessary. Because individuals are .not born alike and have 
different subjective thought processes (which belong to World 2), conse-
quently they "can have either similar or entirely different" conceptions 
of the same thing. These different beliefs can, in the context of World 
3, be essentially "kicked by the logical structure of World 3, which 
shows that their alleged theorem contradicts the objectively true state-
ment" of fact (Popper 1973:22). The "true statement" is true because the 
person making it believes it to be "nearest to the truth" in an absolute 
sense. To arrive at a consensus of opinion the differing individuals 
must be "kicked" by the "laws of 'the fac,t', not by other people", and 
in this way, the World 3 objects "influence our thought proces.ses 
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decisively" (Popper 1973:22). To avoid conflict between individuals 
each must be made to understand the "laws" naturally existing in World 3. 
To expand this point a little more we can say that norms and cus-
toms are "laws" that exist in World 3 and these "laws" define for us 
proper ways of behaving. These norms and customs, because of their a 
priori tradition are conceived as "real" and do in "many different ways" 
influence the way in which we solve our problems. Therefore, our success 
at solving problems will depend 
at least partly upon the existence or non-existence, in World 
3, of a solution to the problem, and partly upon whether or 
not [we] are led by [our] thought process to objectively true 
thought contents" (Popper 1973:23 italics added). 
In this way World 3 objects can have a strong causal influence upon 
World 2 processes, and like a "system of clouds controlling clouds" we 
are made to conform to a particular norm or custom. Obviously if we do 
not, or are unable to, then we will be "eliminated", from society. Only 
the fit must survive. 
Man created the human language and with it discovered knowledge 
which in World 3 becomes realistic and is thus able to order and control 
our physical and mental actions. Inherent in language is a series of 
contents varying between descriptive function and the value of truth. 
As Popper (1973:23) further suggests; 
with its argumentative function and the value of the validity 
of arguments, ..• [and] with it man has created the objec-
tive World 3, ••• and with this, he has produced a new world 
of civilization, of learning, of non-genetic growth: of growth 
which is not transmitted by the genetic code; of growth which 
depends not on natural selection but on a selection that is 
based upon rational criticism. 
The theories about our surroundings in World 1 are therefore produced by 
us, and the consequences of our thinking create new problems deeming 
further consideration for solving. "All of us contribute to its growth, 
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but almost all our individual contributions are vanishingly small" 
(Popper 1975:161). This point should be borne in mind, because it sug-
gests the limited importance of single individual and heightens the 
importance of the collectivity in the. development of World 3. Because as 
Popper (1973:23) further contends, our theories about World 1 are: 
not merely our constructs, for their truth or falsity depends 
largely upon their relation to World 1, a relation which, in 
all important cases, we cannot alter. It depends both upon 
the inner structure of World 3 and upon World 1, the latter 
of which, ••. is the very standard reality. 
Although World 1 "is the very standard reality", World 3 also pos-
sesses "real" factors, and we know that there is an interaction between 
the two worlds via World 2 which suggests that who-so-ever controls 
World 3 can also control World 1, and possibly World 2 as well. Further, 
we know that the human species is not a species of equal individuals and 
each is subject to the "reality" of World 3 which continually defines 
how we should act and think. World 3 is "the World of the products of 
the human mind" (Popper 197 5:106-7, 1973: 20), which includes all of 
culture, and we know that culture, "this mass of extra-somatic tools, in-
stitutions and philosophies, has a life and laws of its own" (White 1949: 
358, 1959:28). Therefore, we now find that biological evolution can be 
scientifically reduced to the single individual, and this process is 
significant for the survival of man, but culture (World 3), although it 
is a product ·of individuals, can only be analyzed as a result of its 
manifestation in the collectivity, and thus, the individual loses control 
over his destiny. 
Continuing with. Popper's final theses we move from "the evolution of 
new means for problem solving, by new kinds of trials, .•• new methods 
for controlling the trials. • • • • [to examining] new standards of 
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selection" (Popper 1975:240 italics added). Of importance to Popper's 
theses is the belief that "The higher levels of language have evolved 
under the pressure of a need for the better control of • . . things" 
(Popper 1975:240). Quite specifically we now understand that World 3 
products have the power of influencing us, and as Popper (1975:240) con-
tends, "their power •.• is part and parcel of these contents and 
meanings; for part of the function of contents and meanings is to con-
trol". We can now also, better understand Popper's use of "clouds" to 
explain World 3 phenomena, because we know that "For the control of our-
selves and of our actions by our theories and purposes is a plastic 
control" (Popper 1975:240). In an open society we are not forced to 
submit ourselves to the control of our theories because we still have 
the right to freely reject them, but this freedom becomes extremely 
difficult to enact once our theories gain social acceptance and become 
part of our established norms and customs. In a closed society however, 
we must accept our theories because we do not have the freedom to criti-
cize them and hence control is complete. 
It is now relevant to refer back to the point made earlier that the 
world of the organism is a natural world, and it acts blindly, while 
remembering that evolution is a trial-and-error process. In such a 
process adaptation takes place almost entirely at the World 1 level. But 
with the development of language and the discovery of knowledge, Worlds 
2 and 3 are introduced into the evolutionary process, and slowly the 
trial-and-error process of survival is reduced, so that, today man no 
longer needs to be fearful of most World 1 attributes. We have developed 
many extensions of our biological selves which in many ways allow us to 
comfortably reside in safety from the rigors confronting the amoeba, for 
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example. But, we might ask ourselves \vhere is the evolutionary process 
we have set in motion leading us? What then is the direction suggested 
by Popper's description of the evolutionary process? Is the influence 
of our World 3 phenomena totally excluding all individuals from the 
process of decision making, or only some? 
Ideology and Control Develop 
Inherent in all species is a condition of instinctive action that 
allows each to interact together with a certain degree of harmony. In 
fact, 
Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature 
of cultural evolution; it is this that makes it possible for 
the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, idealogi-
cal activities to play such an important part in civilized 
life (Freud 1961:44). 
These, 
aspects of human culture . . . have one feature in common. 
They unite one human being to the other, ••. against being 
left alone •.. [and] ultimately, civilization is a series 
of institutions evolved for the sake of security (Roheim 
1971: 109) 0 
To facilitate this condition we find animal and human parents correcting 
their erring off-spring by the use of physical and psychological actions 
which emerge either from the "innate structure (the programme) of the 
organism" (Popper 1975:72) or from the results of a learning procedure 
built-up in thier World 3 theories (culture). Therefore, education is a 
natural condition with an a priori tradition. Such an existence means 
that our World 3 contains a natural institution for promoting acceptance 
of the proper norms ·and customs in society. 
We begin our life-long process in World 2 by learning assumptions 
about our surroundings from our personal experiences and perceptions 
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while learning language. For language provides us with the categories 
that constitute the domains to which these assumptions and beliefs refer. 
As we learn the categories and the domains that they demarcate, we also 
acquire a set of rules (norms, values, attitudes, sanctions) of how to 
behave properly. As "almost all our subject knowledge (World 2 knowledge) 
depends upon World 3, that is to say on (at least virtually) linguistical-
ly formulated theories" (Popper 1975:74), existing independently of our 
own conceptions we learn to accept these ideologically binding formula-
tions. Culture and society thus emerged as ambiguous consumptions, as 
being man's own creations but also having lives and histories of their 
own (see Durkheim 1915:424). "Once this view is accepted" Alvin Gouldner 
(197lb: 53) asserts, "society and culture can be conceived of as autono-
mous things: things that are independent and exist for themselves". 
Society and culture are then amenable to being viewed like any other 
"natural" phenomena in World 1, and, as having laws of their own that 
operate quite apart from the intentions and plans of men (see Gouldner 
1971b:53; Popper 1975:74). 
In this context it becomes obvious that our common sense perceptions 
of our surroundings and our intuitive understanding of them, is "not ab-
solutely reliable" (Popper 1975: 72). Therefore, it becomes also obvious 
that we need a highly articulate mechanism for interpreting W0rld 3 
phenomena, because our subjective facilities are insufficient for the 
task. We necessarily need science. 
With the third world phenomena being accepted as being "natural" 
phenomena, like any physical object, it becomes only a matter of a logi 
cal consequence that the disciplines that studied them could be viewed as 
natural sciences. When Emile Durkheim (1962:lvi) claimed that "Sociology 
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can •.• be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis 
and of their functioning", he was defining an autonomous body of pheno-
mena similar to what Karl Popper defines in his World 3 category. Con-
sequently, it became a simple matter for the early interpreters of 
sociology to borrow methods from the "natural sciences" such as physics 
and biology. To emphasize.the point, we find that a biological or 
natural science approach to the study of World 3 phenomena commences 
with: 
the first category consist[ing] ~f problems concerned with the 
acts of production; ••• The second category of problems is 
concerned with the structures themselves . •.. Very important 
also is the feedback relation from the properties of the struc-
ture to the behaviour of the animals . . • their biological 
functions (Popper 1975:112-113). 
It is these same properties in the social universe that sociology is 
concerned with as it attempts to define the natural laws that enable the 
whole to operate. Therefore, by selecting this phenomena as its realm 
"sociology emerged as a natural science" (Gouldner 197lb:53). In sup-
port of this perspective its proponents claimed simply that, if it 
worked for physics and biology, it should also work for sociology (see 
Lundberg 1955, 1956). 
As the complexity of the cultural knowledge bank increases the task 
for the social sciences becomes more pertinent and necessary. As Karl 
Popper (1975:107) points out: 
The thesis of an objective third world [means that] all these 
entities are, essentially, symbolic or linguistic expressions 
of subjective mental states, ... these entities are means of 
communication-- • • • symbolic or linguistic means to evoke in 
others similar mental states or behavioural dispositions to 
act (italics added). 
Importantly then, since these "symbols ••• are", as c. Wright Mills 
(1972:38) contends: 
separated from the actual persons or strata that exercise the 
authority. The 'ideas', not the strata or the persons using 
the ideas, are then thought to rule ..•. The symbols are 
thus seen as 'self-determining'. 
These ideas therefore become the binding force uniting the individuals 
in society according to some socially determined theme. Further, the 
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"ideology of autonomy involves partial acquiescence," as Alvin Gouldner 
(1971b: 59) suggests, and the message offered is that we should "accept 
the system, [and] work within it" (italics added). Basically then, it 
is because we desire to initiate these "mental states of behavioural 
dispositions to act" that we readily accept in our subjective knowledge 
that to be certain of our understanding of the messages, a perspective 
as objective as science claims to be, is what we require for guidance. 
Further, while all concepts propose lines of action toward social ob-
jects, scientific concepts consensually defined within the community of 
scientists assume that sociologists possess a quality of accuracy that 
common sense concepts seldom posses (Denzin 1973:38). 
In reference to the importance of science as a medium for social 
guidance and control, a comment is needed in respect to the relationship 
between science as espoused by the academic adherents and the ideology 
of culture. It was suggested in the last chapter that today at least 
much of our third world phenomena is the product of academic minds, and 
this seems to be true the more widely these theories become disseminated 
(see Andreski 1973:33-4). Evidence to this effect can be readily seen by 
examining the effect American universities have had in rendering a speci-
fie universal scientific standard credible to the public (Bledstein 1976: 
326; also Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1978:519-521). In fact Burton 
Bledstein (1976:326) points out that: 
To the middle-class American . . • science implied more than 
method and procedure. • • . science established a rational 
and orderly process of development beneath the fragmented 
experiences of American life. 
The institutions of higher learning are producers of marketable items 
according to the dictates of the requirements needed to manage and 
operate a modern technology and capitalist state. By necessity "they 
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produce highly skilled workers and technical knowledge which are useful 
primarily for maintaining the social; political, and economic institu-
tions of our society" (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1978: 520). Organi-
zation as a result is primarily based on standards that eventually lower 
the emphasis on acquisition and dissemination of knowledge for aesthetic 
reasons. Such an emphasis means that individual "rewards are not given 
for sociology ••• and this means, in effect, that sociology remains a 
non-cumulative science" (Denzin 1970:32). As stated in the previous 
chapter, sociology is a product of the developments originating in the 
political state, and, above all, in the market economy of the last cen-
tury. It means then, that by resembling the philosopher-kingdom of 
Plato's dreams "An inclusive instituion, university contained and struc-
tured the culture of ideas in American life" (Bledstein 1976:327). 
Therefore, in summary, it seems reasonable to reflect upon the beginning 
of this chapter to the comments on the Greeks. Thus, we find that in 
many respects the elusive control of World 3 phenomena has been attained, 
and if the "natural pattern of growth" has credance, perhaps the next 
necessary development will "produce dictatorship in the name of the peo-
ple'.' .. 
Plato .took the view that the social nature of man has its origin in 
the imperfection of the human individual, therefore he 
teaches that the human individual cannot be self-sufficient 
owing to the limitations inherent in human nature .... The 
state therefore must be placed higher than the individual 
since only the state can be self-sufficient ('autark'), per-
fect, and able to make good the necessary imperfection of 
the individual (Popper 1971:76; also Nisbet 1977:26). 
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Since this is a "natural" condition supported by a positivistic science 
which maintains that there are not other norms but the laws which have 
actually been set up by nature, it is only "natural'' for a sociologist 
to believe that "it is a gross misunderstanding to believe that the indi-
vidual can judge the norms of society; rather, it is society which pro-
vides the code by which the individual must be judged" (Popper 1971:71). 
Adherence to this view implies that the sociologist is "qualified" to 
understand and make predictions about these laws. A contention that 
easily allows for "the pursuit of control as a goal [and] takes the 
sociologist out of the scientific enterprise and into politics" (Denzin 
197.0:32). In the next chapter an attempt will be made to outline an 
example of this practice as execplified in the works of Emile Durkheim. 
CHAPTER THREE 
DURKHEIM THE MASTER BUILDER 
He will restore us to our original nature, and heal us, and 
make us happy and blessed (Popper 1971:169). 
Introduction 
Man's world is manifest, and his attitudes are manifold. What is 
manifold is often frightening because it is not neat and simple. To be 
comfortable and acquire security we engage ourselves in a process of 
reducing the possibilities open to us. Inherent in this process is a 
desire to control. The wealth of possibilities breeds dread with the 
result that the "wise" tend to offer two ways for understanding and 
ordering the complexity of the universe. But almost invariably only one 
is good. No matter what the truth of the ordering is, belief tends to 
lie in that which gratifies some personal wish. Most human belief sys-
tems tend to hold that ideas are real, or alternatively, material is 
real. In the following analysis of Emile Durheim's work we find the 
integration of both ideas and material to such an extent that finally 
ideas seem to triumph. The manifold world of our existence is thereby 
reduced to a single absolutism. 
Durkheim's theory is best understood in relation to his intentions 
and underlying assumptions. His primary objective was to establish 
sociology as a legitimate science on a footing equal to that enjoyed by 
such recognized disciplines as physics and biology. More importantly, 
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he was attempting to scoop out a niche for sociology between the realms 
of philosophy and psychology. His second objective, and in some ways 
equally important, was to set up a model for the reconstruction of 
society. The legitimation of sociology as a science capable for this 
task was the underlying assumption of his work. Durkheim's contention 
was that in order to validate its claim tolegitimacy, any scientific 
discipline must identify its· own distinctive territory or reality for 
study. Science itself was considered the study of reality, and all 
reality was assumed to be a system of forces that could only be measured 
by their effects. The greater the effects, the more powerful the forces 
must be and the greater their reality. For Durkheim (1962:90), social 
institutions were social facts, and as all social facts are forces, 
these are real to the extent that specific effects can be uniquely at-
tributed to them. That is, the forces in question have their own and 
not a derived, subordinate, or borrowed power, and this is so because 
"although purely ideal ••• they determine the conduct of men with the 
same degree of necessity as physical forces" (Durkheim 1915:260). 
''Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, of their 
genesis and of their functioning" (Durkheim 1962:lvi). These are the 
major perspectives underlying Durkheim's themes which he set out to 
show conclusively. 
All Durkheim's work is based on the assumption that: 
when it is recognized [by the sociologist] that above the indi-
vidual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being 
created by reason, but a system of active forces, a new manner 
of explaining men becomes possible (Durkheim 1915:447 italics 
added). 
When considering the definition of "social facts", Durkheim (1962:35) 
wrote: 
In order to be objective,· the definition must obviously deal 
with phenomena not as ideas but in terms of their inherent 
properties [treat them as material] .... Now, at they very 
betinning of research, when the facts have not yet been ana-
lysed, the only ascertainable characteristics are those exter-
nal enough to be immediately perceived (italics added). 
Therefore, 
since objects are perceived • • • Science, to be objective 
ought to borrow.thematerials for its initial defini-
tions directly from perceptual data •••• Science, then has 
to create new concepts; ••• and return to sense perception 
(Durkheim 1962:43-4). 
Bearing in mind that "To-day it is generally sufficient that they bear 
75 
the stamp of science to receive a sort of priviledged credit, because we 
have faith in science" (Durkheim 1915:438). Within the empirical science 
of sociology, this reality is the object of analysis, but it is taken as 
given without the need for inquiries about its foundations. This inquiry 
is seen as a philosophical task and was engaged in by Durkheim simply as 
a means of validating the realm of sociology. 
A central theme in Durkheim's work is that the network of social 
institutions in any society rested essentially upon a core of moral sane-
tions; that morality, far from being one aspect of society, through the 
association with religion interpenetrated the whole. This was Durkheim's 
fundamental fact and throughout his work he spoke of society as a moral 
reality, and whether writing of religion, of the division of labour, of 
domestic institutions, or even of social currents of crime or suicide and 
the conditions of group membership with which they seemed always to be 
correlated, he conceived the associational emergence of a collective 
"constraint" upon conduct (as an institutionalized "regulation") as an 
element of "collective conscience". Durkheim did not only think that as 
an outcome of human association a "collective "consciousness" was created 
(see Durkheim 1915:423-4,438,208), but also that such contraint, was 
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obligatoriness. This emergence of a collective conscience in relation 
·to specific areas of associational behaviour (marriage, the family, 
property, occupations, laws, political constitutions, education, reli-
gion, etc.) was, in fact, the process of institutionalization. The more 
individuals adhered to this moral institutionalization the greater the 
social solidarity, and the happier the individuals would be. 
Morality, Durkheim argues, is social; it reflects the nature of the 
group (or society) in which it obtains. "The qualification 'moral' has 
never been given to an act which has individual interests . • • as its 
object" (Durkheim 1974:37). Indeed, the worth of the individual is it-
self a social construct. 
[A human's] • • . sacredness . • • has been added to him by 
society. Society has consecrated the individual and made him 
pre-eminently worthy of respect • . . The individual submits 
to society and this submission is the condition of his libera-
tion. (Durkheim 1974:72 italics added). 
Moral behaviour, in Durkheim' s view, is behaviour in harmony with "the 
true nature (or noms and rules) of society". Which means that funda-
mentally, morality reposes upon the value of success or utility of the 
immortal and unlimited entity called "society". Here, in collectivity, 
is the source of all authority and of that discipline, exercised through 
the coercive customs and habits 0f the community, for which Durkheim 
inculcates respect. Science and religion are important to this conten-
tion, because by equating science with the power of religion , Durkheim 
(1915:429-30,438) sees it as being a controlling force of social pheno-
mena. The importance of this analogy needs to be understood as we pro-
ceed. 
Durkheim is also concerned with social reconstruction, and this 
concern results from the belief that present industrial society "leave[s] 
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too large a place for unjust inequalities •••• we desire another which 
·would be more practicable" (Durkheim 1915: 427). As we shall see 
Durkheim does not claim to have the complete answer to this problem, but 
through the use of a common education system "A day will come when our 
societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the 
course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve 
for a while as a guide to humanity" (Durkheim 1915:427-8). The purpose 
throughout the following pages is to outline Durkheim's model of society 
and to show the place he assigns the sociologist within it. 
Setting up the Categories 
"Categories", Durkheim (1915:13) argues, "are applicable to all 
that is real, and since they are not attached to any particular object 
they are independent of every particular subject". A given object is 
rather an intersection of categories; units for reference to elements or 
aspects or states of totally different objects. The relationship between 
the two is relational and kaleidoscopic. Facts, therefore, or sensa~ 
tions, are not the origin of categories, but rather categories are what 
give facts or sensations this or that status or "category". In this 
sense categories can be assumed to exist anywhere Durkheim decides to 
deposit them and in whatever order he chooses. In fact, in The Rules of 
the Sociological Method Durkheim agreeing with the views of Descartes 
and Bacon indicates that "he wishes to employ only scientifically deve-
loped concepts, that is concepts constructed according to the method 
instituted by himself; all those having some other origin 
rejected" (Durkheim 1962:31-2). 
. must be 
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Durkheim connnences with "Society" which he states "is a reality sui 
generis; [and] it has its own peculiar characteristics, which are not 
found elsewhere and which are not met with again in the same form in all 
the rest of the universe" (Durkheim 1915:16; also 1960:26 italics added). 
Society in a sense is a system, and like an organism, tends to establish 
and maintain and equilibrium, even though this may be a moving equili-
brium. Important in Durkheim's (1915:418) schema is that "the sensa-
tions sui generis out of which religious experience is made, is society". 
Religion in fact, is Durkheim's most important category, and accordingly, 
"religion" is presented as the basis for change or growth in society. 
The principal social facts Durkheim chooses to use are: "religion, 
morality, laws, economics and aesthetics11 (Durkheim 1974:96). All these 
categories are interrelated and even economics which, when exemplified 
in the division of labour "consists in the establishment of a social and 
moral order sui generis 11 (Durkheim 1960:61). Through it individuals are 
linked to one another, and their actions and behaviours are determined 
by the aesthetics of religious dictations of morality and laws. In re-
ciprocal reinforcements, religious beliefs sanctify norms of conduct and 
supply their ultimate justification. Religious rites elicit and act out 
attitudes expressing, and thus strengthening, the awe and respect in 
which such norms are held. Thus religion provides, through its sanctifi-
cation and renewal of basic norms, a strategic basis for social control 
iu the face of deviant tendencies and the expression of impulses dan-
gerous to the stability of society. 
In setting up his model of society Durkheim primarily concerned 
himself with reducing the total universe to managable proportions. Resor-
ting to the perceived categories in common sense perception he assumed 
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that the first logical categories were social categories; the first 
classes of things were classes of men into which these things were inte-
grated. This was so because men were grouped and thought of themselves 
in the form of groups and in their ideas they grouped other things into 
regularities. Out of these ideas and opinions grew the idea of a society 
"which, once born, obey[s] laws all their own" (Durkheim 1915:424). 
Once individual ideas are expressed in language or written down they 
cease to be part of ourselves, but as they are exposed to objective 
criticism of others, the collectivity of ideas form a bank of knowledge 
that has a life of its own. Society, culture, religion and even science 
are born of these opinions (Durkheim 1915:418,438). Thus, the center of 
the first scheme for natural symbols becomes by the force of this argu-
ment the quest for natural systems of symbolizing. Traditionally 
Durkheim considered 
Religion sets itself to translate these realities into an in-
telligible language which does not differ in nature from that 
employed by science; the attempt is made by both to connect 
things with each other, to establish internal relations between 
them, to classify them and to systematize them. • . • both pur-
sue the same end; scientific thought is only a more perfect 
form of religious thought (Durkheim 1915:429). 
Thus, Durkheim establishes the importance of religion as an agent for the 
socialization and explanation of society from which science can naturally 
emerge and follow. 
For Durkheim religious representations were collective representa-
tions and that which makes religion binding in man's life is not religion 
as idea, but religion as membership, as communal participation. The 
authority of religion is, basically, the authority of society, but it is 
given an intensity that no other aspect of social life reveals. Such 
intensity emerges from man's ageless division of the world into the 
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sacred and the profane. Religion is society, but it is a focus of those 
aspects of society which are endowed with sacredness. Hence, the almost 
infinite influence of religion on culture and personality, and even on 
the establishment of the authority of reason "is the very authority of 
society, transferring itself to a certain manner of thought which is the 
indispensable condition of all common action" (Dtirkheim 1915: 17). 
In the Division of Labour Durkheim attacks the problem of origins 
in a way that leads directly to his later systematic treatment of this 
problem in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. He says: 
There are in each of us ••• two consciences: one which is 
common to our group in its entirety which, consequently, is 
not ourself, but society living and acting within us; the 
other, on the contrary, represents that in us which is per-
sonal and dis tinct, that which makes us an individual. . • • 
There are, here, two contrary forces, one centripetal, the 
other centrifugal, which cannot flourish at the same time. 
We cannot, at one and the same time, develop ourselves in two 
opposite senses. If we have a lively desire to think and act 
for ourselves, we cannot be strongly inclined to think and 
act as others do. If our ideal is to present a singular and 
personal appearance, we do not want to resemble everybody 
else. (Durkheim 1960: 129-130). 
The conflict between these "two consciences", both of which are 
aboriginal is to a very large extent what motivates the whole process of 
social development. In religion we find two opposed categories: the 
sacred and the profane, and similarly: in each of us the same division 
occurs with the self. By understanding how these divisions operate means 
that we are in a better position to control one and allow the full expres-
sion of the other. Knowing this factor allows for a fuller understanding 
of Durkheim's method and purpose also. The concept of the sacred, like 
the concept of authority, is one of the constitutive elements of 
Durkheim's analysis of social behaviour. Ourkheim restored religion to a 
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central role in the study of man, and attributed to it indispensable 
symbolic and integrative properties in social and intellectual systems. 
Durkheim therefore, is concerned with the opposition between society 
and the unsocialized individual. The socialized individual is acceptable 
as that which is sacred to society, while the unsocialized individual 
isolates himself from the "collectiveness" in society and is therefore 
profane. Essentially, religion is a society's classification of some 
things as sacred and others as profane. Sacred things are, by nature, 
superior in dignity and power to profane things, and this is particularly 
true in their relation to man himself. Man looks up to them, emulating 
himself in one degree or another, so that his relation to the sacred is 
sometimes one of awe, love, or even of measureless dread, but sometimes 
one of ease and pleasure. Man, however, is always in a state of ex-
pressed inferiority before his gods, and as society has in Durkheim's 
terms a god-like property, it is only natural that we should hold it in 
reverence (see Durkheim 1973:48-53, 1974:73-5, 1915:431). 
Therefore, the idea of the sacred and, with it, the communal, be-
comes the basis of Durkheim's interpretation of the character of religion 
(Durkheim 1958:171), and he applies the perspective of the sacred and the 
profane to specific institutions in societies in order to show the his-
torical and psychological source of their authority. Importantly, 
Durkheim rejects the view that religion is defined by beliefs in gods or 
transcendent spirits and he does not believe its origins can be made 
synonomous with those of magic. Religious beliefs, Durkheim (1915:44) 
maintains, "are always common to a determined group, which makes [a] pro-
gession of adhering to them and of practicing the rites connected with 
them" (italics added). These believers as we shall see later are the 
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socialized individuals who hold to the values and norms of the "collec-
tive". It should be pointed out here that by imputing to society the 
reverence of God, Durkheim is doing so simply because "it is quite cer-
tain that anything man has ever handled, felt, come in contact with or 
lived can become a hierophany" (Eliade 1974:11). More importantly, 
since, as Durkheim points out, society is the origin of all things 
social, and "because religion is human it must for that very reason be 
something social, something linguistic, something economic" (Eliade 1974: 
xiii). Therefore, religion becomes the "essences" of society and not 
just of a supernatural being called God. We shall return to this point 
later. 
As so far indicated Durkheim saw it necessary to discard the indivi-
dual from his analysis. By "disregarding the individual as such, his 
motives and his ideas" we can then "seek directly the states of the 
various social environments (religious confessions, family, political 
society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms of which the variations 
[between them] occur" (Durkheim 1952:151 italics added). Further, in 
The Rules of the Sociological Method we find that "when the individual 
has been eliminated, society alone remains. We must, then, seek the 
explanation of social life in the nature of society itself" (Durkheim 
1962:102). But, Durkheim is concerned with justifying a set of data that 
was to be the realm of the new discipline sociology, and rejection of the 
individual from social phenomenon was not to be as simple as the state-
ments quoted above suggest. Durkheim commences with a definition of man 
that is acceptable to our common sense reasoning, and then expands his 
spliting operation to validate society in the common sense realtiy of the 
individual from where it arose. Thus, he concerns himself with ana-
lysing the duality of the self. 
At a common sense level of abstraction man is both "body" and 
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"soul" and intersection and integration of two different realms of being. 
We acknowledge this distinction because "sense" is "common" and the more 
that it is universal, the truer it is. For example Durkheim repeatedly 
appeals to that which is "common" to "sense" in order to establish the 
validity of his definitions. In defining "man" in his essay on The 
Dualism of Human Nature Durkheim (1973:150) says, "In every age, man has 
been intensely aware of this duality. He has in fact everywhere con-
ceived of himself as being formed of two radically heterogeneous beings: 
the body and the soul". Durkheim thus defines "body" and "soul" as a 
binary opposition universal to human thought and experience, that is, as 
that which is the most "common" to "sense". In a like manner he argues 
his case that "society" is an irreducible constraining power, and he 
does so by appealing to the "common sense" experience of "eternality". 
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim (1915:237) notes 
that given ends and interests contrary to those of the individual, society 
11requires that, forgetful of our own interest, we make ourselves its ser-
vitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and 
sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible". Consequently, 
individuals find themselves subjected to "rules of conduct and of thought 
which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even con-
trary to our fundamental inclinations and instincts" (see also Durkheim 
1915:298). 
This conception of an individual--social opposition underlies all 
Durkheim's basic categories of explanation of society (see Durkheim 1952: 
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319, 1960:130). In The Division of Labour Durkheim makes a universal 
association between "body" and "soul" and organic and mechanical soli-
darity. Man is both "body" and "soul" by definition, so if his being is 
respectively associated with societies bound together by organic and 
mechanical solidarity, then when he becomes one or the other, namely all 
body or all soul, then man is no longer man but a social fact. Meanwhile, 
societies constituted of souls, that is, those based on mechanical soli-
darity, are united, moral and happy, and those constituted of bodies, 
that is, based on organic solidarity, are abnormal, immoral and indivi-
daulistic. Similarly, the individual who exists in the condition of 
"body", or individualistic in nature, is disruptive to a united society, 
whilst an individual existing in the condition of all "soul", is com-
pletely socialized and united with the collectivity of society. Ob-
viously one of these conditions has the connotation of being better than 
the other. Durkheim gives an example of this in his Suicide, where we 
find that suicide is merely a behavioural completion or parallel to 
rational connections in a meaningful, and far more real universe. 
Therefore, not only does Durkheim appeal to common sense to validate his 
definition, but his definitions are themselves common sense ones. Social 
reality or social facts are the most universal elements of human ex-
perience, the "conscience collective". 
Conceiving of the individual and the social as opposed forces, 
Durkheim feels that the greater the internalization of the social com-
ponent the greater the control it exercises over the individual and the 
less his freedom of choice. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this 
is to be found in his account of the mechanical solidarity in The Divi-
sion of Labour. Other examples such as altruistic suicide in Suicide, 
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and primitive religion in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life are 
given where personality is composed almost wh3lly of the internalized 
social factor, and "the collective conscience chains us to our group and 
shackles the liberty of our movements" (Durkheim 1960:304). In modern 
society (Organic solidarity) personality is a less completely inter-
nalized component, social control is weaker, and the individual is freer 
from the restrictions found in primitive society (Mechanical solidarity). 
As social products these needs can be restrained only by the moral power 
of the group; to the extent that this restraint is lacking, a means-needs 
dysjunction arises and creates the unhappiness that brings man to suicide 
or crime. Thus Durkheim holds that the more the individual is subject to 
the sacred and moral control of the group, the more scaled down are his 
personal needs, the more needs and means exist in a state of equilibrium, 
the happier man is and the less likely he is to commit suicide or crime; 
hence regulation, suicide and crime vary inversely. As man is freed from 
social restraint he experiences an unfulfilled need to find meaning in 
life by his own activities, or a means-needs disequilibrium resulting 
from the insatiable nature of his own needs, passions, and desires. Com-
pletely divorced from society, he is subject to the profane and the 
"blind and amoral forces of nature" (Durkheim 1974.:55). Either way, the 
individual does not exist in the realm of fre~dom, but in Durkheim's 
society he can be at least happy. 
In summary, man lives in a society as both a "body" and a "soul". 
The "body" is the physical and psychological being or part of the self 
that maintains the individuality in modern industrial society. The 
"soul" is the conditioned other of the self that unites the individual 
with the "conscience collective" where he is controlled and acts in 
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accordance with the norms and values of his society. The ideal society 
for Durkheim is primitive society, the mechanical solidarity. There 
are obvious problems with Durkheim's construction here, but generally 
the duality of the self is accepted in our common sense reasoning be-
cause man is a social being and society is something external to our-
selves and it does seem to exercise an influence over our everyday 
activities. A life of change in the midst of a social revolution, ap-
peared to Durkheim unnatural, and only a stable whole, the permanent 
collective, has natural reality, not the passing individuals. 
Setting the Stage: The Division of Labour 
Durkheim like most grand theorists of his time, focused his concern 
on the vast, complex, highly specialized, and rapidly changing processes 
brought about by industrialization. The social changes Durkheim observed 
in Europe, and especially in France at this time had disrupted and made 
completely outmoded the old social orders of traditional societies, with-
out seemingly assuming a satisfactory order of its own. The French Revo-
lution had occurred a hundred years before, but still by the end of the 
nineteenth century mankind to many statesmen and intellectuals appeared 
to be adrift; dragging along, so to speak, behind a social milieu which 
individuals could not control. Durkheim, like most of his predecessors, 
set for himself the task of bringing order to this milieu. Importantly, 
Durkheim was greatly impressed by aspects of the French Revolution and 
this was to have a significant influence on his writings. For him the 
French Revolution 
was in large part a great movement of national consolidation, 
• • • for all moral and political particularism. Never did we 
have a more vivid feeling for the supremacy of collective in-
terests; and of the sovereignty of the law, dominating in its 
majesty the multitude of individuals. 
expressed by the theorists as well as 
period (Durkheim 1973:259). 
These sentiments are 
the statesmen of the 
Durkheim's central aim as already stated was to provide an under-
standing of society on the basis of which a new "social solidarity" 
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could be achieved which was appropriate to the new complexity of econo-
mic and social actions. He was deeply concerned·about the unrest, the 
unstability, the insecurity, the lack of firm beliefs, the lack of a 
settled morality, the "anomie" or general "normlessness" which attended 
the lack of fit between many institutions in this modern situation; and 
he wished to resolve these problems. 
Determined to dispense with ethics, Durkheim argued, that social 
facts were to be considered "normal", "healthy", and "good", if they were 
found on the average in societies of the same type and at the same phase 
of evolution, and "pathological", "morbid", and "bad", if they were ab-
normal in this sense. The role of the statesment was not to strive for 
political reform in the light of ethical ideals, but to seek to keep 
society in a condition of "normal health". We have seen, too, that 
according to Durkheim "social facts" existed in their own "natural" 
right, adjusted themselves to each other naturally in accordance with 
the conditions within which society as a whole was placed, and conse-
quently it was an error and futile to seek to understand and explain 
these processes of social facts in terms of individual purpose (see 
Durkheim 1962:80-124). 
In The Division of Labour Durkheim argued that, during the evolution 
of society a very simple division of labour concomitant with a social 
solidarity resting chiefly upon a strong traditional authority of "repres-
sive law" gave way to a much more highly differentiated division of labour 
88 
in which the social solidarity was a concomitant of the division of 
labour itself; that is, restitutive law, which was the real basis of the 
moral bond in society. Let us note that strickly speaking, this was a 
two fold typology: a construction of a "mechanical" type and an "or-
ganic" type of which specific changes could be interpreted; but Durkheim 
did give much comparative illustration of these kinds of labour divisions 
among his various kinds of "social species". Also we must remember that, 
any conception of "normal" division of labour in a society was, according 
to Durkheim, that which was found on the average in that social species 
and at that particular phase of evolution. "Social solidarity" and its 
appropriate division of labour at a particular level of social evolution 
was therefore "normal", "healthy", and "good". 
At the end of Durkheim's study we find a shift in definition. We 
find that if in many societies, different kinds of division of labour 
are concomitant with different kinds of social solidarity, all good and 
well. But, we find, in comparing all societies at the phase of evolu-
tion of industrial capitalism, that the division of labour exhibits an 
extraordinary degree of specialization which is concomitant with a 
highly mobile, flexible change among many institutions which leaves them 
disconnected and ill-fitting, and both the institutions and the indivi-
duals among insecure, restless, anxious, pulled by hectic motives of 
material gain, status emulation, and the like. Durkheim's conclusion 
then should be that this is the "normal" condition of the division of 
labour, and that social instability and not social solidarity is found 
"on the average" in societies of this type and at this phase of evolution. 
As the "normal" condition of this "social fact" in this type of society, 
it should be held that "instability" is the "healthy" condition of this 
society, "good" and "desirable"; and the statesmen's task should be to 
keep it in this condition of "normal" health. 
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We might ask then, is that what Durkheim thought? He certainly re-
cognized that this was the "normal" condition of societies characterized 
by industrial capitalismbecause he wrote, "there the state of crisis 
and anomy is constant and, so to speak, normal" (Durkheim 1952:256). 
However, Durkheim did not accept that this condition of health was good 
and desirable for modern society, because "anomy is the contradiction of 
all morality" (Durkheim 1960: 43ln). Indeed, he was anguished about thJs 
"normal social fact" which he had discovered in his comparative study of 
modern industrial societies. Furthermore, Durkheim was not only dis-
turbed about this social fact as a thing in its own right, but also for 
the consequences of its "individual manifestations" (Durkheim 1952:256). 
Now we notice Durkheim changes his argument, and instead of adhering 
to the concept of the "normal", his argument shifts to the fact that 
since the division of labour had produced social solidarity in all the 
societies studied so far, that this should be taken as its "normal func-
tion". A pathological phenomenon exists "when it is not within the 
average, whether it be above or below it" (Durkehim 1960:432). This, it 
can be seen, appears as a complete inconsistency, for it is specifying 
as abnormal in one type of society a social fact which is found to be 
normal in that type of society, simply on the assertion that its nature 
in all other types of society establishes its normal function. "The 
same method must be followed in ethics", Durkheim (1960:43) tells us, 
"because we need only determine the normal intensity of the social reac-
tion which follows the violation of the rule". 
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In pursuing this point further we note, that to assert that it is 
the normal function established in societies which have emerged so far 
which is healthy, good, desirable; and that any new normal social fact 
in new social conditions must be considered abnormal, pathological, and 
to be avoided in terms of this assertion; and that the object of the 
statesmen should be to avoid the new "pathological" condition and pre-
serve this earlier "normal", "healthy" function; is to construct a vast 
intellectual, ethical, ideological, and political apparatus of conser-
vatism. This is in fact exactly what Durkheim was doing. I shall return 
to this point later. But it should be noted here that such a construe-
tion was imputed by Durkheim (1960:246-7) with a condition of morality, 
Durkheim's "morality" was in effect that a synthetic society allowed men 
simply to be what they were anyway, namely body and soul, and this is 
advocated, not arbitrarily, but according to the ultimate principles of 
reason itself. Reason is not determined by sensory experience because 
reason is necessary and universal (Durkheim 1915:14). On the other hand, 
sensory experience is not determined by reason because the latter is 
socially relativistic. Finally, society is not reason, nor is society 
sensations, that is, it is not dissolvable into the materiality of this 
world. Therefore, what Durkheim is doing here relates to the fact that 
Rational thinking is thinking according to the laws which are 
imposed upon all reasonable beings; acting morally is conduc-
ting one.' s self according to those maxims which can be extended 
without contradiction to all wills. In other words, science 
and moral imply that the individual is capable of raising him-
self above his own peculiar point of view and of living an im-
personal life [as a fully social person] (Durkheim 1915:445 
italics added). 
"Though normally the division of labour produces social solidarity" 
Durkheim 1960:353) wrote: 
it sometimes happens that it has different, and even contrary 
results. It is important to find out what makes it deviate 
from its natural course, [because] the study of these devious 
forms will permit us to determine the conditions of existence 
of the normal state better. 
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This "better" understanding will as Durkheim (1960:375) contends, enable 
us "to change the established order and to set up a new one". However, 
the use of the word "natural" here is interesting especially since 
Durkheim spoke of a social fact being denatured if the function which it 
appeared to have in certain societies become transformed in later and 
more complex changes (Durkheim 1960:372), but his is a very odd notion 
if social facts and their functions are differently normal in different 
"social species". The word "natural" seems arbitrary here, and is simply 
being used to lend strength to particular social facts as the argument 
requires. Elsewhere, Durkheim used similar terms which carried a moral 
connotation. Thus, he not only spoke of the "denaturing" of social facts, 
but also the "debasement" of human nature. 
It was also part and parcel of Durkheim's account of the evolution 
of.the division of labour that the strength of the early kind of "collec-
tive conscience" in connection with strong traditional authority became 
enfeebled, as a more complex and rational moral consensus came with 
greater differentiation in society. This too therefore was "normal". 
This concept can therefore be used to explain the supposed "abnormality" 
of the "normality" of "anomie" that he also mentions (Durkheim 1960:364-
5). 
In short, Durkheim explained the "abnormality" of the actual "nor-
mality" of the relations between the complex division of labour and social 
instability by simply asserting that in modern industrial capitalist so-
cieties the course towards a new social solidarity was not yet completed. 
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The "conditions of equilibrium" had not yet been established. The many 
conflicting interests in society had "not yet had the time to be equili-
brated". This was going to eventually happen: "Social facts" as 
"things" in social systems did establish new equilibrium situations; and 
this despite the finding that all the facts demonstrated that anomie 
was normal in these societies. Nevertheless, the "highest perfection 
can be determined only in the function of the normal state" (Durkheim 
1960:434). 
Importantly here, Durkheim never really considers that his "social 
facts" would move towards a successful equilibrium on their own account. 
For, we find in the preface to the second edition of The Division of 
Labour not only that the "normal" condition of the division of labour in 
these societies is unhealthy, but also that society has an aim, "which 
is to suppress, or at least to moderate, war among men, subordinating 
the law of the strongest to a higher law: (Durkheim 1960:3). Here also 
we find that society is not only surprisingly "teleological", but also 
surprisingly ethical, for it turns out that it has duties as well as 
aims. 
Durkheim in presenting society as a system likened it to an or-
ganism, and in his system of "things" the "organic" type of division of 
labour, it was the industrial "corporation" that was the basis of the 
moral consensus and solidarity of social life (Durkheim 1960:5). Since 
it was now obvious that society had failed, it became necess.ary for men 
to act purposefully to reconstitute industrial corporations in order to 
resuscitate the moral life and the social solidarity of society. In 
fact, Durkheim (1960:29) laid down proposals for this task for the 
guidance of statesmen. Also, such a program should not be piece-meal 
93 
for "Justice" Durkheim (1960:406) wrote, "must prevail" throughout the 
entire network of contractual relationships. Such action was needed, 
with the rise of great industry and the large-scale contractual rela-
tions of cormnerce; "not because of the economic services it can render, 
but because of the moral influence it can haven (Durkheim 1960:10,23). 
It is curious here to note that Durkheim could only regard as a 
"moral" action, one which would contribute to social solidarity. He 
wrote, "It is, indeed, impossible to regard some practices as moral 
which would be subversive of the societies observing them, for it is a 
fundamental duty everywhere to assume the existence of the fatherland" 
(Durkheim 1960:423). Therefore, given the urgent need for the reconstruc-
tion of the industrial corporation: "How ••• important it is," 
Durkheim (1960:423-4,387) said, "to put ourselves at once to work estab-
lishing the moral forces which alone can determine its realization!" 
It is also important to remember here that Durkheim considered him-
self a scientist and considered that as such he was aptly situated to de-
sign social reconstruction programs, and in fact it was his moral obli-
gation to do so, because "The clearer our notion of reality, the more apt 
we are to behave as we should. It is science that teaches us what is. 
Therefore, from science, and from science alone, must we demand the ideas 
that guide action, moral action as well as any other" (Durkheim 1973:274). 
Reasons for Social Reconstruction: Crime and Law 
Durkheim used the example of crime and the law (and Custom) to empa-
size the importance of the sociologist to society because these were the 
best indicators of the network of established institutions. "Since law 
reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity, we have only to 
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classify the different types of law to find the different types of social 
solidarity which correspond to it" (Durkheim 1960:68). 
In the modern industrial state current thinking was evidently based 
on the idea that a presumably normal person who violates the existing 
social code threatens, more so than an insane person, the viability of 
that code. This being so, social reaction, Durkheim contended, was not 
one which was concerned with the welfare of the person who broke the 
code, but with the welfare of the code itself. To the extent the viola-
tor is considered normal yet subjected to punishment he or she must be 
seen as a sacrifice for the welfare of many. This Durkheim suggested 
was a characteristic of all societies. As a result, concern was not only 
with making criminals "pay" when they were punished, but that concern was 
with making them an embodiment of suffering which balances the affront to 
the moral order. "When we desire the repression of crime, it is not we 
that we desire to avenge personally, but to avenge something sacred which 
we feel more or less confusedly outside and above us" (Durkheim 1960:100). 
The power of the moral order comes from the fact that it is a collectively 
held set of beliefs. Therefore, Durkheim considered it is the sociolo-
gist, who from his disengaged vantage point, who could feel a sense of 
horror when he read of the excessive nature of "repressive" sanctions 
being prescribed. Thus, it was the sociologist who could then work to-
wards the introduction of the more equable "restitutive" form of punish-
ment because, as Durkheim advocates, the sociologists as scientists are . 
the keepers of society. 
Let us examine "social facts" a moment. Durkheim (1962: 13) wrote: 
A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of 
exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, 
every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, 
while at the same time existing in its own right independent 
of its individual manifestations. 
Certain social ways of acting and thinking and these social facts could 
be quite dissociated from the form, or nature, in which they were em-
bodied in the minds of individuals. But as Durkheim (1962:7, 1973:277) 
further points out, 
It is the collective aspects of the beliefs, tendencies and 
practices of a group that characterizes truly social pheno-
mena. As for the forms that the. collective states assume 
when refracted in the individual, these are things of another 
sort. 
What Durkheim has done here is state firstly, that "social facts" 
were now lifted to the position of an existence independent of all the 
socio-psychological aspects of individuals as they had been affected by 
the process of association, and secondly, the study and explanation of 
them was to take place without reference to these socio-psychological 
aspects of individuals. ·The "social facts" existed in some realm of 
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reality in their own right, and they were to be explained solely in terms 
of each other and the sick processes of interdependence as existed among 
them. 
There is no doubt then, that when Durkheim spoke of society as a 
system of independent social facts which were things possessing func-
tional relations with each other, changing, differentiating, integrating 
in relation to the total environmental conditions of the whole; and in 
accordance with an equilibrium--disequilibrium process of adaptation, he 
really meant precisely that. He most certainly did have in mind a new 
substantive kind of reality; a super-organic being or a qualitatively 
distinct kind of associational facts in conditions of inter-dependency. 
The constraint of social facts, Durkheim (1962:125) wrote is that: 
recourse to artifice is unnecessary to get the individual to 
submit to them of his entire free will; it is sufficient to 
make him become aware of his state of natural dependence and 
inferiority ••• Since the superiority of society to him is 
not simply physical but intellectual and moral, 
Further Durkheim (1915:444) writes: 
Society is not at all the illogical or a-logical, incoherent 
and fantastic being which it has too often been considered. 
Quite on the contrary, the collective consciousness is the 
highest form of the consciousnesses. Being placed outside 
of and above individual and local contingencies, it sees 
things only in their permanent and essential aspects. 
Society is both source and object of morality (Durkheim 1973:86, 
1974:59), and moral regulations express "needs that society alone can 
feel" (Durkheim 1960:5). Therefore, "to act morally is to act in terms 
of the collective interest" (Durkheim 1973:59). Given the individual 
and society as opposed forces, the greater the morality, the less the 
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control exercised by the individual over his own behaviour. It is when 
he is freed from social control that he acts in an immoral or, at best, 
amoral fashion. Thus anomie and crime is the contradiction of all mo-
rality and strong social control its source. In short, Durkheim does 
not link morality with freedom of choice; indeed, freedom from social 
control is basically subversive of morality. 
Furthermore, man has a basic 11need to be contrained, bounded [and] 
restricted" by society (Durkheim 1973:113). Therefore, only through 
society can the individual realize his own potential as a human being 
(Durkheim 1974:55). Society far surpasses the individual and represents 
the ultimate of his moral behaviour (Durkheim 1974:44-5, 1973:86). This, 
coupled with the inherently good and superior nature of society makes it 
desirable for the individual (Durkheim 1974:54-6, also 1973:243, 1962: 
liv). When the individual understands the basically beneficial and 
necessary nature of the social commands embodied in moral rules he is 
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lead to voluntary compliance, which therefore remains compatible with the 
autonomy and self-determination of the individual (Durkheim 1973:116-120). 
As set out in Moral Education Durkheim (1973:17-126) considers this 
to be the individuals "duty" to society (also Durkheim 1974:35-62). The 
impact of society is in no way intolerable, and individuals do not ex-
perience its weight any more than they feel the weight of the atmosphere 
on their shoulders. They live in a physical environment with its at-
tendant restraints successfully, and society is not different in this 
regard. Therefore, having been raised by the collectivity, the indivi-
dual "will naturally desire what it desires and accept without difficulty 
the state of subjection to which he finds himself reduced" (Durkheim 
1958:61, also 1962:6). To reject this state the individual automatically 
subjects himself to the "sanctions of society'. The sources of these 
"sanctions" and the reasons why they exist are because "acts universally 
disapproved of by members of each society" are "collective sentiments" 
and these "are common to the average mass of individuals of the same 
society" (Durkheim 1960:81); so to break them brings the individual into 
conflict with the sentiments of the society thus calling forth strong 
feelings of disapproval. 
That should be enough to show how Durkheim posits an individualistic 
debt and subservance to society. Durkheim (1915:446-7) conceived of 
society as a fund of creative forces with 
a distinctive level of associational processes, and the crea-
tivity of society as a new level in nature of socio-psycho-
logical interaction and creation, can be accepted without at 
all accepting the reification of a social organism, completely 
independent of "individual manifestations". 
In summary, "Society", Durkheim (1973:277) wrote, "is a complex of ideas 
and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual 
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and moral framework distinctive of the entire group. Society is above 
all a consciousness of the whole". Therefore, "social facts" do exist, 
and as Durkheim insisted, they can be seen to possess at least a number 
of characteristics. Namely, (a) they are external to the individuals in. 
society; they are material entities; (b) they are constraining upon indi-
viduals, in that individuals, find them objectively existent, and are 
compelled to come to terms with them; (c) they are diffused, and in the 
most established cases general throughout the society, and (d) they have 
a nature going beyond their individual manifestations. 
To understand Durkheim's analogy of "health" and "illness" we must 
note the importance of the religious distinction between the sacred and 
the profane in his methodology. We will speak more on this feature 
shortly. On the other hand, Durkheim (1960:34) assumed the existence of 
conditions of health and illness in societies and then sought objective 
criteria for them. While he was investing the regularities of occurrence 
of facts in society with the additional connotations of the word "health" 
and social irregularities with those of the world "illness", Durkheim 
followed this analogy by stating that "crime • . • is a factor in public 
health, an integral part of all healthy societies" (Durkheim 1962:67). 
Similarly, he carried the analogy completely into his conception of the 
role of the statesmen or legislator. Political leaders should not seek 
to change society in accordance with ethical ideals. Although this may 
be discouraging for men to feel that their "ideals" in society are not 
going to be attained or realized, Durkheim contended that political 
activity 
is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that 
retreats as one advances, but of working with steady perse-
verance to maintain the normal state ••• [and further] his 
role is that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of 
illness by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they 
have appeared (Durkheim 1962:75 italics added). 
This peculiar condition, nevertheless, is very important in 
Durkheim's scheme of "things" as we shall see, but firstly let us ex-
amine an example of what is posited here. If the normal crime rate of 
murders in societies of the same type are, say 500 murders a year, and 
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the actual number in a specific society is only 400, then this society is 
unhealthy; it is suffering some morbid, pathological condition; so then, 
the statesmen must bring conditions back to the normal level of hygiene 
at which there will be 500 murders. Other examples can be given such as 
the normal rates of unemployment, and the like. On the other hand, as we 
saw earlier, the "normal" condition of "anomie" in industrial societies 
must be combated because the division of labour in th.ese societies is not 
performing the function which it "normally"· fulfills in other types of 
society. As was mentioned earlier Durkheim was concerned with social re-
construction; and so we need to understand that for him the maintenance 
of uniformor "normal" crime rates was closely related to his purpose. 
Durkheim was an admirer of the great crises in social history such as 
"Christendom", the "Reformation and Renaissance", and the "revolutionary 
epoch and the Socialistic Upheavals" (see Durkheim 1974:92) in so far as 
they led to "moments of collective ferment [in which] are born the great 
ideals upon which civilizations rest" (italics added). At such times 
"The periods of creation or renewal occur when men for various reasons 
are led into a closer relationship with each other" (Durkheim 1974:91). 
Therefore, before social reconstruction could commence, a condition of 
"collective consciousness" had to be reached in all societies. Crime was 
an individual act and thus unhealthy and "bad" and the continued crime 
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rate, Durkheim hoped, would help raise the "consciousness" of the masses 
towards change (Durkheim 1915:443). 
As we have seen, Durkheim was concerned with, society and this point 
should be continually borne in mind. With this objective he saw fit to 
discard all elements of human purposiveness as constituting grounds of 
"causality" in social affairs. His grounds for doing so, I might, 
clarify, were related to the metaphysical entity of society as he con-
ceived it (see Durkheim 1962:103-4). That is, Durkheim (1973:227) wrote: 
Society is not the work of the individuals that compose it at 
a given stage of history, nor is it a given place. It is a 
complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of 
feeling, a certain intellectual and moral framework distinc-
tive of the entire group. Society is above all a conscious-.· 
ness of the whole. 
Additionally, Durkheim (1915:418) wrote: 
For that which makes a man is the totality of the intellec-
tual property which constitutes civilization, and civiliza-
tion is the work of society •••• society cannot make its 
influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in ac-
tion unless the individuals who compose it are assembled 
together and act in common. 
By insisting upon the uncovering of social facts, Durkheim was ac-
tually asserting that society was a natural entity, a system of social 
facts at their own level, and an explanation of any of these facts and 
their relationships was a deterministic explanation in terms of cause-
and-effect connections between a certain species of "things". So that, 
what Durkheim meant by "things" we shall define again: 
Things include all objects of knowledge that cannot be con-
ceived by purely mental activity, those that require for their 
conception data from outside the mind, from observations and 
experiments, those which are built up from the more external 
and immediately accessible characteristics to the less visible 
and more profound (Durkheim 1962:xliii) • • 
On the basis of this conception Durkheim fully and deliberately excluded 
all "purpose" in "individual consciousness" and all "uses" which indivi-
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duals could comprehend as "purposes" from being possible sources of "ex-
planation". He replaced these purposes and uses completely by "efficient 
causes" among the inter-connections of social facts themselves, and the 
"functions" in terms of their fulfilment of societal needs. Importantly, 
these "social facts" could only be understood by the sociologist who was 
not a member of society. These metaphysical "things" were real to them 
even if they weren't to anyone else (Durkehim 1962:35,43-4). 
For Durkheim there were two elements in any social milieu: material 
and immaterial conditions and artifacts. For example, codes of law, 
works of literature, as well as natural resources, buildings, tools, wea-
pons, and so on, on the one hand; and the human milieu, the people of the 
group in their collective conditions, on the other. Clearly Durkheim 
argued, only the latter can be the source of the creative energy that 
leads to institutionalization and the development of society. Durkheim 
considered himself a sociologist, and also that his task was to seek some 
characteristics of this human-social milieu which he asserted, without 
reduction to psychological and biological factors, could be shown to be 
responsible for the causation and the development of social facts. There 
were, he claimed, two such characteristics: firstly, the sheer number of 
units in the group (population in the society), and secondly, the degree 
of dynamic density of all these units in their interaction in the group 
as a whole. 
To begin here, Durkheim held to the view that sociology was con-
cerned with a specific order of "things". That is, to describe what the 
things of its subject-matter were, to observe and record their qualities; 
and. secondly to classify them in accordance with the observable varieties 
among them; thirdly to investigate the causes of their nature and their 
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varieties by "methodical inductions"; and then fourthly, to compare all 
·these results in order to arrive at a statement of general "laws": 
statements of constant concomitance which existed among them. 
Mechanical and Organic Solidarity 
In order to analyse this transformation of the division of labour 
and the nature of social solidarity Durkheim constructed his two "types". 
Then having, as he thought, established that the function of the division 
of labour was to unite the specialization of tasks in society in an over-
all social solidarity; and having insisted that this was essentially a 
basic moral order pervading society; Durkheim then sought the external 
characteristics whereby the nature of the morality existing among the 
people might be measured. To put this another way, he looked for some 
observable index of the nature and intensity of the collective moral sen-
timents which operated in society. This "visible symbol", he argued, was 
the law in society, and, going a little farther than this, it was the 
sanctions manifested in the law which were a clear index of the intensity 
with which certain moral precepts were held in "sentiments" of the com-
munity. He then argued that two "great classes" of sanctions could be 
distinguished among judicial rules, namely, "repressive" and "restitutive" 
sanctions: the first characterizing penal law, the second characterizing 
other elements of the law, such as civil, commercial, procedural, adminis-
trative and constituional law (see Durkheim 1960:425-7). His two "types" 
of social solidarity were constructed on this basis. 
In relatively simple societies possessing a relatively simple divi-
sion of labour, with simple techniques traditionally regulated and re-
peated from generation to generation, with only a moderate "dynamic 
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density" among the population, with a wide-spread familiarity of aware-
ness and a sense of "likeness" or similarity among its members, and with 
predominately, a body of regularitory law which was "repressive", there 
was what Durkheim called a "Mechanical Solidarity". People, though per-
forming special tasks, did so within a simple framework of rules, tradi-
tions, and expectations and were not too much dependent on each other. 
The values and rules of society could be upheld by a simple "repressive" 
law which visited the ·indignation of society upon the offender punishing 
him, seeking an "expiation" of his guilt in so doing, and, above all, re-
inforcing the traditional morality of the people as a whole. Such a 
society could become quite large, even embracing the earlier civiliza-
tions and the City States of antiquity, and the "ancien regime" of 
Christendom. The crucial element to which Durkheim pointed was that, in 
all such societies the "industrial corporation", or occupational group, 
was not only an economic enterprise nor only a narrow contractual rela-
tionship of an economic nature. It was in the fullest sense a social 
group providing many social and communal supports, functions, festivities, 
serving also as a basis of moral and even of religious life. The "in-
dustrial" or economic life of the people still found a fully ordered 
place within the intimate context of the wider fabric of values and 
other social institutions. There was a clear, supported, and continu-
ally reinforced consensus of traditional values and practices linking 
man's economic life meaningfully and richly with the entirety of 
society. 
The second "type" distinguished by Durkheim was the very large and 
complex society of the nation based upon modern industrial capitalism 
which was characterized by curious, but clearly related, paradoxes. 
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First of all, a greatly increased population brought with it a greatly 
intensified dynamic density among its members and consequently a greatly 
increased moral intensity of reciprocal demands, contracts, needs, obli-
gations, and duties. Secondly, this brought with it curiously conflic...: 
ting tendencies indeed paradoxical socio-psychological conditions. The 
extreme specialization bound men together in bonds of close dependence 
upon each other which were objectively quite inescapable. Men could not 
now manage at all to sustain their mode of life alone; to make their own 
motor cars, shoes, suits of clothes, or economic organization, as labour 
in large societies is complex and reciprocal (see Durkheim 1973:132). 
They were objectively constrained by these general external "social 
facts" which were, themselves, rooted in inescapable "collective condi-
tions". At the same time, individuals were subjectively denuded of many 
dimensions not only of social and moral, but.also of economic life. They 
were themselves simply units of labour, factors of production. Work it-
self was not a creative activity embodying personal skill in creating a 
whole object for clearly seen use; it was a specialized, automatic "bit" 
of a process of production. Even the work relations of men were not 
longer of a full social nature, but narrowed down to the where economic 
compulsion of wage-earning. The complex, contractual structure of econo-
mic enterprise was orientated entirely to contractual interest so that no 
over-all unity of belief or morality, or social or personal discipline, 
unified this complexity. There was, in fact, a condition of "anomie", of 
"normlessness" in which men compulsorily constrained by the objective 
pressures of specialization, were subjectively adrift; unrelated to each 
other in any satisfying way, and possessing no framework for meaningful 
life, either as a citizen or as a person. This complexity was both 
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marked, and, if anything, furthered, by the growing predominance of "res-
titutive law" whose rationale was simply to make restitution for injuries 
done to ensure "the return of things as they were". This reinforced 
little more than the propriety of the contract itself. This second 
"type" was that which Durkheim called "Organic Solidarity" indicating the . 
intricate nature of interdependence within it. 
One of the crucial points here is to be found in the movement from 
the "Mechanical" to the 11 0rganic" type of solidarity, the division of 
labour itself becoming the principal ground of social solidarity. His 
argument was that social change had proceeded so rapidly that there had 
not been time for a thorough 11adjustment 11 of social institutions to take 
place. His ultimate proposal was that such an 11 adjustment11 should be 
assisted by political policy by deliberately bringing about an appro-
priate "reconstruction" of the "industrial corporation". 
Durkheim argued, for example, that "provincialism" was dead 
(Durkheim 1960:28), and that nothing which did not recognize the large-
ness of scale and the centralization of society could now be effective. 
Similarly no "political" solution, whether "regional" or "central" could 
put these matters right, as they were beyond the range of ordinary poli-
tical policies. What was required was a thorough re-organization from 
top to bottom of industry itself. Especially required was the actual 
recreation, the resuscitation, of the entire "industrial corporation" it-
self, for as Durkheim argued, this had come to be split into senseless 
and expedient "specialisms". Attention thus should be given to the social, 
the moral, and the communal aspects of the provisions for life of its mem-
bers and not to economic matters alone. Of prime importance in Durkheim's 
scheme is that of making a virtue out of specialization (see Durkheim 
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1960:30, 1915:443). According to Durkheim, the days were gone when men 
could think of a full, rounded education and ~ife encompassing all the 
ingredients of "Mechanical Solidarity". To avoid all collisions their 
emphasis should now be upon performing one task with satisfactory skill 
in contributing to the complex division of labour as a whole (see 
Durkheim 1952:390). In such an orientation would lie a satisfactory 
"ethic"~ and, perhaps, a satisfactory personal and social ideology for 
life within these new industrial conditions. "The categorical imperative 
of the moral conscience" then as Durkehim notes, "is assuming the fol-
lowing form: make yourself fulfil a determinate function" (Durkheim 
1960:43). 
It is important to see that in his proposals for the reconstruction 
of the "industrial corporation" Durkheim saw this as a kind of "filling 
in" of the gap between individual and State with elements of socio-econo-
mic organization which would effectively focus men's allegiance and multi-
faceted social life and effort, by the provisions of an actual set of 
social conditions which would themselves engender new moral sentiments 
and new judicial rules. Durkheim (1960:28) wrote: 
The nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the 
individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary 
groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly 
in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the 
general torrent of social life. Occupational groups are suited 
to fill this role, and that is their destiny (see also Durkheim 
19.52: 380-1). 
Further, 
Social life can be divided, while retaining its unity, only if 
each of these divisions represents a function . . • . But first 
the corporation must be organized. It must be more than an as-
semblage of individuals . . • It can fulfil its destined role 
only if, in place of being a creature of convention, it becomes 
a definite institution, a collective personality, with its cus-
toms and traditions, its rights and duties, its unity (Durkheim 
1952:391). 
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Thereby Durkheim portrays the complex, specialized society which would 
provide the basis for the richest fulfilment and freedom of the indivi-
dual. Indeed, what he was proposing was a return to the conditions of 
his "Mechanical Solidarity", which was "accordingly, a real discussion 
which.makes us believe that personality was so much more complete when 
the division of labour had penetrated less" (Durkheim 1960:404). 
Durkheim's entire emphasis in his study of the changing nature of 
social facts, as traditional societies yielded to modern industrial capi-
talist societies, was essentially a study of morals. Moral sentiments 
and moral sanctions pervaded the whole structure of institutions in so-
ciety; morality lay at the heart of institutionalization. Durkheim's 
"occupational groups" were such a condition of institutionalization that 
produced such solidarity within the society. "Norality", Durkheim (1960: 
399) tells us, "in all its forms, is never met with except in society". 
Therefore, we could conclude that Durkheim's new "corporation" meets all 
of these conditions: 
Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything 
which forces him to regulate his conduct through something 
other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as 
solid as these ties are numerous and strong (Durkheim 1960:398). 
Durkheim's essential point is that to be a free discriminating indi-
vidual person is only possible within such a condition of society. In 
his "mechanical" society, the individual's obligation is to "resemble his 
companions"; that is, to conform to others. Similarly, it is only in the 
highly specialized society where the individual is "autonomous" to any 
degree (Durkheim 1960:403-4), and in accordance with Durkheim's condi-
tions of "normal", that such a situation would be considered abnormal, 
pathological, and "bad". Of significance here is Durkheim's (1973:257) 
contention that "We can only dedicate ourselves to society if we see in it 
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a moral power more elevated than ourselves". The motive power of so-
ciety, so to speak, is thus considered to lie. in the power of "religion", 
for here is deposited the harnessed energy necessary for controlling all 
other social facts. The magnitude of this motive power is always finite 
because, "A society can neither create itself nor re-create itself with-
out at the same time creating an ideal • • • the collective ideal which 
religion expresses" (Durkheim 1915:422-3; see also 237-8). 
In modern society the being of power that is society is often op-
posed by the personal purposes and desires of individuals because "col-
lective representations also contain subjective elements, and these must 
be progressively rooted out, if we are to approach reality more closely" 
(Durkheim 1915:444). The reality Durkheim seeks is the new society, 
which 
is possible only when the individuals and things which compose 
it are divided into certain groups, that is to say, classified, 
• • • it is necessary that each particular group have a deter-
mined portion of space assigned to it: .•• which everybody 
conceives in the same fashion. • • • the co-operation of many 
persons with the same end in view is possible only when they 
are in agreement as to the relation which exists between this 
end and the means of attaining it. (Durkheim 1915:443-4). 
To this point we have dealt with the mechanics of Durkheim's justi-
fication of the problem inherent in modern industrial society. The next 
section examines how Durkheim intended to bring about changes. 
Reconstruction through Education 
Basic to Durkheim' s aspirations for achieving the reconstruction of 
society is the importance of education. To commence with, Durkheim (1973: 
260) tells us, "we assign to the individual an end that transcends him, 
••• provide some objective for the need for devotion.and sacrifice that 
lies at the root of all moral life". Then, once we have provided these 
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goals, education must be used to convey "a sense of the real complexity 
· of things" to the individuals, and "This, sense must finally become or-
ganic to him--natural, as it were--and constitute a category in his mind" 
(Durkehim 1973:260-1). By these means education "can lead him on the 
road to understanding that society is not simply the sum of individuals 
who compose it" (Durkheim 1973:262, also 1915:422). Once this is under-
stood, "he can no .more separate himseif from it than from himself. It is 
the collective consciousness that we must instill in the child", and as 
Durkheim (1973:276-7) contends, "It is the business of th_e school to or-
ganize it methodically". 
For education to have any success in conveying its message to the 
child it had to be organized in a specific way according to Durkheim. 
Durkheim realized that if "the child has obeyed a given person many 
times, he is quite naturally brought to borrow from this same person cer-
tain attributes associated with the influence exerted over him by the 
latter" (Durkheim 1973:142). During Durkheim's time this meant being 
subjected to the influences of the one or maybe two or three teachers for 
all subjects a child was taught in school. But, Durkheim (1973:142) 
contended: "Such an education would, by force of circumstance, easily 
lead to subservience. The child could not fail to reproduce passively 
the single model placed before him". Therefore, to avoid this "kind of 
servitude", and insure "that education does not make of the child a car-
bon copy of the teacher's shortcomings," Durkheim (1973:143) wrote, we 
must rotate "the teachers in order that they may complement one another," 
and also to ensure "that the various influences prevent any one from be-
coming too exclusively preponderant." 
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The "aim of the school is to prepare for life ••• [and] it would 
· fail in its task if it made the child develop habits that the conditions 
of life would someday contradict" (Durkheim 1973:205 italics added). 
Thus, important to Durkheim's scheme was the fact that, in order to com-
mit oneself to "collective ends, we must have above all a feeling and 
affection for the collectivity". Thus, before one makes a commitment, 
"he must be fond of life in a group setting" (Durkheim 1973:238). There-
fore, if we hold that "Associations can only spring up • • • when the 
feeling for association awakens", it is possible and reasonable to expect 
that "it cannot awaken except within already existing associations" 
(Durk.heim 1973:239). This was Durkheim's concern, and as "existing as-
sociations" could be "bad" he contended that: 
The only way of getting out of this circle is to get hold of 
the child when he leaves his family and enters schooL It is 
at that moment that we can instill in .him the inclination for 
collective life. For the school is a society, a natural group 
• . • [and] if the child, at this decisive time, is carried 
along in the current of social life, the chances are strong 
that he will remain oriented in this way throughout his life. 
[Thus], if he develops the habit of expressing his interests 
and activities in various groups, he will keep the habit in 
his post-school life; and then the action of the lawmaker will 
really be fruitful for it will emerge from soil that education 
will have prepared (Durkheim 1973:239 italics added). 
Durkheim then, would have accomplished his goal of a "new corporation". 
The "laws" of the legislator and statesmen would consequently he enacted 
to maintain this condition in the "child". 
These ideals are simply the ideas in terms of which society 
sees itself and exist at a culminating point in its develop-
ment. Ideals are not abstractions, cold intellectual concepts 
lacking efficient power. They are essentially dynamic for be-
hind them are the powerful forces of the collective" (Durkheim 
1974:93). 
Therefore, we may conclude that ''the only thing necessary for a society to 
be coherent is that its m,embers have their eyes fixed on the same goals", 
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and that they, "concur in the same faith" (Durkheim 1973b:48). "The be-
liever bows before his God, because it is frm<~ God that he believes that 
he holds his being, particularly his mental being, his soul". Becuase as 
Durkheim (1974:73) argues, "We have the same reasons for·experiencing 
this feeling before the collective". 
So what we want or perhaps need if we are going to correct social 
ills, is "to love and respect that which is ideally perfect", for as 
Durkheim (1974:75) tells us, "God Himself could not be the object of such 
a feeling, since the world derives from Him and the world is full of im-
perfection and ugliness". Essentially what we are looking for is some-
thing even more perfect than God. Christianity was rejected by Durkheim 
(1973b:53) as "A religion which tolerates sacrilege", and as such, "ab-
dicates all dominion over man's minds (Consciences)". As Durkheim 1973b: 
52-3) tells us, with the advent of christianity "The very center of moral 
life was thus transported from the external to the internal, and the in-
dividual was thus elevated to the sovereign judge of his own conduct, 
accountable only to himself and to his God". But, "Finally, in consu-
mating the definitive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, in 
abandoning the world to the disputes of men, Christ delivered it at once 
to science and to free inquiry." This "explains", according to Durkheim 
(1973b:52-3), "the rapid progress made by the scientific spirit from the 
day when Christian societies were established". Thus, with the aid and 
guidance of science as Durkheim (1973b:51) suggests: 
we make our way, little by little, toward a state, nearly 
achieved as of now, where the members of a single social group 
will have nothing in common among themselves except their hu-
manity, except the constitutive attributes of the human person 
(personne humaine) in general. 
The "religion of yesterday could not.be the religion. of tomorrow" 
(Durkheim 1973b:51). Because as Durkheim (1915:431) says: 
From now on, faith no longer exercises the same hegemony as 
formerly over the system of ideas that we may continue to call 
religion. A rival power rises up before it which, being born 
of it, ever after submit it to its criticism and control. And 
everything makes us foresee that this control will constantly 
become more extended and efficient, while no limit can be as-
signed to its future influence. 
The essence of religion is the community of ·believers, the indis-
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pensible feeling of collective oneness in worship and faith (see Durkheim 
1915:44). It is the consistent part of Durkheim's conception of religion 
that a deity expresses in a person from the power of the society, a power 
clearly felt, though not so consciously defined. For Durkheim God is 
society "apotheosized", and therefore, society is the real God. This 
identity is adumbrated in the totem animal, a sacred object; and more 
clearly shown in the person deity, Jahveh,.or Zeus. The tribal god is, 
like the totem animal, which is often confusedly conceived of as a member 
of the group; another evidence of the close relationship between group 
and deity. That is, that which is considered sacred in a society is 
given its awesome qualities by virtue of its capacity to represent values, 
sentiments, power, or beliefs which were shared in common; the sacred ob-
ject comes out of and is supported by the total society. The profane 
object, on the other hand, is not supported in this manner. It may have 
a considerable utility, but it gains its value primarily from the extent 
to which it is useful to some individual, as it has little or no public 
relevance, such as the criminal for example dealt with earlier. 
The sacred object represents or symbolizes some force which is 
capable of inducing submissions, awe, a sense of personal impotence, hu-
mility, and powerlessness to the individual. In Durkheim's terms science 
can occupy this same position, especially when the force that is capable 
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of achieving this position, in relation to the individual is society. 
The position is achieved when society validates the sacred object, so 
that the sacred object becomes a symbolic representation of the social 
force. Other examples can be given, but the important factor to remember 
in understanding this example, is that Durkheim considered religion could 
not be conceived of in rational terms. This was because, from his point 
of view, religious rites appear to be' "only an external translation con-
tingent and material, of these internal states which alone pass as 
having any intrinsic values" (Durkheim 1915:416). The essence of reli-
gion, according to Durkheim (1915:416, and 1973b:51), is not what it says 
about things, external or internal, but what it does toward making action 
possible, and life endurable. "Our wills alone can make it a living re-
ality" Durkheim (1974:89) tells us, because "Society cannot make its in-
fluences felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the 
individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common". 
So that, as Durkheim (1915:418) further argues, "It is by common action 
that it takes consciousness of itself and realizes its position; it is 
before all else an active co-operation". 
By rejecting christianity Durkheim considered he was belying the im-
portance of "individualism" and its manifestations of social instability, 
abnormal, and pathological conditions of the industrial capitalist state, 
and through the use of science returning "society" to a "Mechanical" type 
solidarity. As an example of his new model of "society" Durkheim con-
tended that "Religious minorities are an interesting example of the tem-
pering of character, of the training of life that a strongly cohesive 
group communicates to its members " (Durkheim 1973:239-240). As Durkheim 
perceived it, these minorities offered a good example of the rejection of 
the "individual" self. That is, the "body" in favour of the "soul". 
For, he says: 
With the religious minority, there is a backlog of solidarity, 
of mutual aid and comfort; there is something unifying, which 
sustains the faithful against the difficulties of life .•.• 
There is pleasure in saying 'we', rather than 'I', because 
anyone in a position to say 'we' feels behind him a support, a 
force on which he can count •••. The pleasure grows in pro-
portion as we can say 'we' with more assurance and conviction. 
[Therefore] To experience the pleasure of saying 'we', it is 
important not to enjoy syaing 'I' too much (Durkheim 1974:240 
italics added). 
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Thus, for Durkheim (1960:279), the "Collective life is not born from in-
dividual life, but it is, on the contrary, the second which is born of 
the first". 
Therefore, Durkheim was hoping for a decline of egoism and the 
flowering of a "cult of man" as a source of solidarity in the modern 
world. This cult Durkheim (1973b:49) claimed, "has as its primary dogma 
the authority of reason and as its primary rite the doctrine of free in-
quiry". The "man" which is its object is not the concrete personality 
but a social reality, a shared, idealized conception of the individual 
which is "sacred in the ritual sense of the word". Therefore, there is no 
contradiction in speaking of "a religion in which man is at once the wor-
sh;Lper and the god" (Durkheim 1973b:46). 
Precisely as he makes religion into a manifestation of society and 
its crucial phases, Durkheim makes society, in turn, depend upon a non-
rational, super-individual state of mind that can only be called religious. 
Between religion and society there is a functional interplay. We see how 
the "organic" division of labour brought into being an entire system of 
rights and duties, binding the individuals together in a "corporation" of 
"solidarity". The condition of "anomie" a~ Durkheim perceived it required 
the reconstruction of the "industrial corporation" as he argued it, to 
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bring about an adequate "fit" between the several levels and elements of 
society. It is important to note that Durkheim was not intertaining the 
thought of dispensing with a class society. Indeed, he believed that the 
people should be taught "how torespect natural superiority without ever 
losing .•. [one's] self-respect". Importantly, Durkheim (1973b:33) 
stated, "This is what the future citizens of our democracy must be". 
What he wanted, was for individuals to appreciate their niches in society 
as they were organized by the "division of labour", and for them these 
niches would be "just" and the "ultimate" extent of individual require-
ment. Such positions were not only "natural" but also morally correct, 
and from these the individual attained an existence of reverence or 
essense-like properties. 
The duties of the scientist then, are to understand these "spatial" 
and "temporal" relations, and keep the national leaders and politicians 
informed accordingly, so that they could "maintain" the status-quo. This 
duty was also "natural" and "moral" for "Moral discipline not only but-
tresses moral life", but is moral life (Durkheim 1973:46); and of course, 
"Legal authority . . • is still a rule whose morality is not contested" 
and exists to aid in the maintenance of society (Durkehim 1960:427). 
Conclusion 
Concluding this review, it can be said that Durkheim's two major 
aims were the development of a model of society, and the refining of his 
sociological method. Of significance in this regard is Durkheim's con-
tention.that the scientist "must throw off, once and for all, the yoke of 
those empiric categories which from long-continued habit have become ty-
rannical" (Durkheim 1962:32). Simply because, to "start fromthe concept 
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of man • • • it is impossible to reach a truly objective conclusion" 
(Durkheim 1960:421); and, "It is evidently itr.possible ever to find the 
law dominating so vast and varied a world, if one begins by observing it 
in its entirety" (Durkheim 1960:420). Instead, Durkheim (1960:421) tells 
us: 
First of all this concept of man, serving as the basis of these 
deductions, cannot be the product of a scientific elaboration, 
methodically conducted; for science is not able to give us that 
information precisely. 
The alternative appears to be precisely that once the parameters of so-
ciety are constructed according to an ordered and controlled division of 
labour, science will be adequate for investigating the regularities so 
defined. In Durkheim's schema then, the realm of sociology is most de-
finitely not that of an holistic discipline. 
Sociology therefore, was to be a selective discipline. The impor-
tant implication of this situation can be closely related to Durkheim's 
attitude toward the role of the political state. Durkheim felt that the 
basic function of the state was its social control function, and since all 
things social are necessarily the preoccupation of the members of society, 
Durkheim essentially advocated the general subserviance of the individual 
to the authority of that body. Durkheim (1960:219-222) justified the ex-
pansion of the state by suggesting that, as the small family businesses 
were eliminated by the dev~lopment of industrial capitalism, "the number 
of different enterprises grew less". Consequently, i'public distress" re-
suited, and since "distress of some general scope cannot be produced with-
out affecting the higher centers", such as the political state and its 
"subsidiary organs", these are increasingly "forced to intervene out of 
self-preservation" and "moral obligation" to ameliorate this dysfunctional 
situation. 
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Since a stable government cannot operate without an efficient and 
consciously acceptable ideology, science has a necessary function in pro-
moting this condition. In fact, Durkheim stressed functional obligations 
and political dependency, "because we fill some domestic or social func-
tion", and as a result such was our social role in society. Further, 
Durkheim (1960:227) says: 
we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have 
no right to free ourselves. There is above all, an organ upon 
which we are tending to depend more and more; this is the 
state. The points at which we are in contrast with it, multi-
ply as do the occasions when it is entrusted with the duty of 
reminding us of the sentiment of common solidarity. 
Obviously then, this schema derives its impetus from the works of 
the Greek philosophers since a close similarity exists between Durkheim's 
model of the ideal society and that outlined by Plato. In the last chap-
ter some mention was made of the present day effects and influences of 
works such as Durkheim's and together with the discussion in the first 
chapter it seems pointless covering these points again. But most de-
cidedly, Durkheim's positivism is still very much in vogue. 
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